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1 Introduction
There is widespread agreement that financial intermediation is not only a veil
between savers and borrowers but it has a fundamental role to properly characterize
the business and financial cycle (Adrian and Shin, 2010; Borio, 2014; Brunnermeier
and Sannikov, 2014, 2016; He et al., 2017; He and Krishnamurthy, 2019).
There are several channels through which the financial sector may affect the
business cycle. In this paper we focus on two specific functions of the financial
sector: risk pooling and risk mitigation.
On the liability side, by issuing a risk-free bond (i.e. via leverage) the financial
sector provides a risk-mitigation instrument to householders. This creates a risk-
mismatch between the intermediaries’ assets (risky stakes in firms) and liabilities
(deposits or other low-risk assets).
Exogenous systematic shocks change the relative size of the financial sector,
and so its provision of risk pooling and mitigation. In turn, this affects the macro-
dynamics of the economy as a whole. The magnitude of the mismatch, and so the
sensitivity of the intermediaries’ balance sheet to exogenous systematic shocks,
relates to the amount of financial sector leverage, itself dependent on the size of
idiosyncratic risks within the economy. The higher the leverage the higher the
impact.
The objectives of this paper are: a) Investigate the joint effect of systematic
and idiosyncratic shocks on both the real and financial economic dynamics in a
model where financial intermediaries pool idiosyncratic risk of productive activities
and provide risk mitigation to the households/entrepreneurs (later on h/entrepren-
eurs); b) Highlight the important role played by the financial sector leverage and
size in mitigating and amplifying consumption and output fluctuations.
We model the general equilibrium productive economy in continuous-time, and
solve for the equilibrium joint dynamics of capital prices and size of the financial
sector in closed-form.1
We assume that capital is held by equally risk averse heterogeneous h/entre-
preneurs and an aggregate financial sector.2 Financial frictions are introduced by
1From the methodological point of view, we follow the approach proposed by Brunnermeier
and Sannikov (2014), however, the economic model is largely different focusing on the leverage
of the financial sector rather than on leverage of non-financial firms. Morover, the role of the
financial sector in our model is primarily to mitigate risk, and thus to provide a risk-free asset
to the h/entrepreneurs rather than monitoring the borrowers.
2The objective function of the financial sector is to maximize the utility of the discounted
stream of dividends (consumption) paid out to the bankers, who are risk-averse (log-utility). This
assuming segmented financial markets. In the spirit of Diamond (1984), the fin-
ancial sector has a cost advantage at pooling idiosyncratic risks. It collects risky
claims issued by different firms after the payment of an intermediation (monitor-
ing) cost and offsets its assets with its own capital endowment plus bond issuance.
Due to market segmentation, each household is also an entrepreneur that in-
vests in its own specific firm only, sustaining both systematic and idiosyncratic
risks. Since h/entrepreneurs are not able to diversify idiosyncratic risks among
themselves, they purchase a risk-free bond issued by the financial sector. The
bond acts as an instrument of risk mitigation and allows h/entrepreneurs to smooth
consumption.
In equilibrium, the h/entrepreneurs’ demand for risk-free bonds is supplied by
the financial sector, that uses it to leverage its balance sheet. Firms are therefore
financed by both h/entrepreneurs and financial intermediaries that in our frame-
work provide venture capital, that is, they bear a fraction of all the risk of the
firm asset rather than financing them via debt securities. Therefore, firms neither
do leverage nor default.
What is also important to stress is that, differently from Brunnermeier and
Sannikov (2014), h/entrepreneurs do not leverage either.
We silence both the channels of firms’ and households’ leverage on purpose
because we aim to focus on the effect that financial sector leverage has on the
business cycle, without the indirect effects that leverage of non-financial firms’
and householders’ might generate (differently from Brunnermeier and Sannikov
(2014) and Korinek and Simsek (2016), among others).
When an exogenous systematic shock hits the economy, the financial sector
balance sheet is affected more than proportionally with respect to the one of h/en-
trepreneurs’, thus affecting its (relative) capitalization as well as the amount of
pooled idiosyncratic risk.
Because of this setting, we differentiate significantly from Brunnermeier and
Sannikov (2014), since in our framework the role of the financial sector is two-
folded. On the one side, it supplies the economy with risk-mitigation instruments.
On the other side, it generates risk endogenously as its leverage over exposes
the wealth dynamics to aggregate fluctuations. Therefore, financial sector lever-
age contributes both to the amplification and mitigation of exogenous systematic
shocks to aggregate consumption and output fluctuations, respectively (differently
than in Brunnermeier and Sannikov, 2014, where leverage of the non-financial firms
assumption prevents the financial sector from default. It also allows us to study the features of
the equilibrium by its non-degenerate ergodic density.
3
only amplifies exogenous shocks).
Morover, it is interesting to observe that the relationship between financial
sector leverage and exogenous systematic shocks is counter-cyclical as in Brunner-
meier and Sannikov (2014) non-financial firm leverage, but for different economic
reasons. In fact, in our framework, after a negative shock, the financial sector rel-
ative wealth share decreases, while its leverage increases further, to keep up with
the h/entrepreneurs’ higher demand for risk-free bonds. The opposite holds as a
response to positive shocks: the financial sector increases its relative capitalization,
its leverage reduces, and so does its supply of risk-free bonds.
The mechanism is consistent with recent empirical findings suggesting counter-
cyclical financial leverage (see He et al., 2017).3
From the macroeconomic perspective, the financial sector capitalization chan-
nels exogenous systematic shocks because the width of aggregate output and con-
sumption fluctuations largely depends on financial leverage. The dynamics of
output is affected by intermediation costs both in its drift and volatility. Due to
those costs, the output per unit of capital depends by a factor that negatively
relates to size of the financial sector.4
The output drift is decreasing in the size of the financial sector due to a pe-
cuniary externality : the larger the financial sector capitalization, the lower the
aggregate productivity of capital (due to high intermediation costs per unit of
capital), the lower the cost of capital, the lower the investment in new capital.
The output volatility is mitigated due to a positive externality : having a large
fraction of idiosyncratic risks that are pooled by the financial sector implies that
3This stylized fact stays in stark contrast with previous evidence in Adrian et al. (2014) where
leverage is pro-cyclical. This is due to our choice of considering financial intermediaries focusing
on their activity as central dealers of idiosyncratic risky claims, and relates to the marginal value
of the financial sector’s aggregate wealth. Pro-cyclical leverage empirical evidence also features
in Adrian and Shin (2010, 2013) and has a theoretical foundation in Adrian and Boyarchenko
(2012). In this stream of the literature, pro-cyclical leverage is a consequence of pro-cyclical
VaR leverage constraints. The problem of leverage cyclicality is also discussed in Adrian et al.
(2016), where they consider the difference between market and book leverage. In particular, the
paper shows that procyclical book leverage derives from financials reducing lending by reducing
their debt, while countercyclical market leverage comes from the fact that more of the value of
the financial firm is in the hands of the debt holders during downturns, as the share price of the
bank falls.
4This result squares nicely with the empirical evidence in Philippon and Reshef (2012), claim-
ing that the size of financial intermediaries relate to the remuneration of their executive; in fact,
they show that the size distribution of financial firms explains about one fifth of the premium for
their executives. This is relavant because financial services account for up to 25% of the overall
increase in wage inequality since 1980. In particular, they argue that financiers may be overpaid
from a social point of view.
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capital is overall less productive (due to intermediation costs). Thus, being the
size of the financial sector positively related to its own stock of capital, a negative
relationship holds between aggregate financial capitalization and productivity. The
latter decreases the size of capital growth rates fluctuations as driven by systematic
shocks.
Another theoretical result of our model concerns the equilibrium risk-free in-
terest rates; in our model, equilibrium risk-free rates turn negative when the fin-
ancial sector is small.5 This effect mirrors the h/entrepreneurs’ higher demand
of risk-free bonds, and it does not require a crisis situation to take place. Pro-
cyclical interest rates co-exists with counter-cyclical Sharpe ratios both for pooled
and un-pooled risky claims.
In the last part of the paper we study agents welfare as related to the size of
the financial sector.
For the h/entrepreneurs, the welfare benefit of risk mitigation is counter-
balanced by the associated -indirect- cost, that is paid in terms of a lower individual
and aggregate consumption growth.
Overall, we find that the h/entrepreneurs benefit the most when the financial
sector is neither too small (offering too little -and costly- risk mitigation) nor too
big (so that h/entrepreneurs have a lower level of capital).
Motivated by this finding, we investigate whether static leverage constraints
and redistributive taxation policies could be welfare improving for the h/entrepren-
eurs. According to our model: a) A tax that redistributes wealth from the financial
sector to the h/entrepreneurs’ prevents the former from growing too large, and so
to waste too many resources after intermediation costs; b) Leverage constraints
contribute at reducing both drift and diffusion of relative wealth process between
sectors, thus affecting the equilibrium macroeconomic dynamics. The direct effect
of the prudential policy is to stabilise the dynamics of aggregate consumption,
while it negatively affects the mitigation of the output fluctuations. When the
constraint is binding, a further drawback consists of an impaired capability of
intermediaries at rebuilding their wealth.
The welfare effect of the policy is thus two-sided: from the perspective of the
financial sector, the result is a net welfare loss. This is because when the leverage
constraints are binding, they keep the financial sector relative capitalization at a
low(er) level with a high(er) probability. Conversely, leverage constraints may be
welfare-improving for the h/entrepreneurs, as there exists a trade-off between the
5According to Gourinchas and Rey (2017), a weakened financial sector may lead to persistently
low, or even negative, short term interest rates for an extended period of time.
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gain from the higher growth rate of their consumption versus the loss due to a
weakened financial sector (less mitigation).
This suggests that there exist leverage constraints and redistributive taxation
policies such that the size of the financial sector remains within an “optimal” range
in order to improve h/entrepreneurs’ welfare.
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 1.1, we frame our results as related
to the incumbent literature. In Section 2, we outline the model micro-foundation.
We start by introducing production technologies and returns on risky assets (2.1).
Then, we introduce the agents and their optimization problem (2.2).
In Section 3, we derive the competitive equilibrium (3.1) and discuss the bench-
mark cases of full-risk-pooling and no-risk-pooling (3.2). In Section 4, we focus
our analysis on the intermediate case where both classes of agents co-exist and
characterise the link between financial sector leverage and the dynamics of real
(4.2) as well as financial (4.3) macro-variables. Finally, in Section 5, we study the
effects of risk pooling and mitigation on welfare and investigate the role of leverage
constraints and redistributive taxation policies at increasing the h/entrepreneurs’
welfare. Section 6 concludes.
1.1 Related Literature
This paper belongs to the body of literature describing the relationship between
financial intermediation, macroeconomic dynamics, asset pricing, and their implic-
ations for welfare.
Methodologically, we are close to the seminal work of Brunnermeier and San-
nikov (2014). However, we substantially diverge in several dimensions. While in
their model the most productive agents (experts) leverage their balance sheet, in
our model the h/entrepreneurs do not leverage, even if they are the most product-
ive agents. Conversely, it is the financial sector that leverages up and sells to the
h/entrepreneurs risk-free bonds in exchange of a fraction of risky equity capital of
their firms.
What follows is that, in our model, more productive agents have extra risk
exposure, and thus demand for mitigation instruments. On the contrary, financial
intermediaries, even if less productive, provide risk-pooling (and mitigation) by
buying risky claims from the h/entrepreneurs, and risk mitigation by issuing risk-
free bonds that they sell to h/entrepreneurs and therefore leverage up.
It is also relevant to stress that, whereas in our model positive relative shocks
favor the financial sector, in Brunnermeier and Sannikov (2014) they benefit the
6
experts.6
Another important difference concerns the financial frictions. In Brunnermeier
and Sannikov (2014) model, the friction is that the experts’ consumption must
hold positive, whereas the consumption of households’ may be negative. In our
case, the friction comes after the assumption of market segmentation. These dif-
ferences lead to substantially opposite equilibrium dynamics and ergodic wealth
share distribution. In these terms, our model is complementary to their.
More specifically, we can structure our contribution along the following di-
mensions: the role of exogenous (systematic and) idiosyncratic risks in a dynamic
model with frictions (IR); the role of financial sector leverage (LV ) and size in
amplifying but also mitigating the propagation of exogenous idiosyncratic and sys-
tematic shocks (AM ), as well as their effect over the business cycle, consumption,
and their fluctuations (BC ); how the allocation of risk and market segmentation
relate to asset pricing (AP); the welfare implications of leverage and size of the
financial sector (W ).
An early approach connecting the allocation of risk to portfolio choices (IR)
in a general equilibrium set-up is in Heaton and Lucas (2004). Their analysis
builds on the observation that idiosyncratic risk is priced by the market, since
agents are risk averse and unable to diversify idiosyncratic shocks by themselves.
Nevertheless, they do not consider any financial sector, nor the connection between
financial leverage and asset pricing.
By introducing market segmentation, our model also relates to the body of
literature that studies incomplete markets and the role of aggregate uninsurable
shocks in equilibrium dynamics. Seminal papers in this field are Aiyagari and
Gertler (1991), Huggett (1993), as well as Aiyagari and Rao (1994), where pre-
cautionary savings and transaction costs are introduced in a general equilibrium
exchange economy.7 A cornerstone theoretical contribution that relates to the
field is Allen and Gale (1994), where the relationship between incomplete mar-
ket participation of households and asset pricing volatility is studied in a static
setting.8
6This happens because, in both models, positive aggregate shocks structurally advantage the
leveraged counterpart, since they increase more than proportionally its relative share of aggregate
wealth.
7A comprehensive review of these models and applications in continuous time with a focus
on their macroeconomic implications is in Achdou (2017).
8A recent contribution introducing a different form of market segmentation in a general equi-
librium model with banks and aggregate risk is Gale et al. (2018). In their paper, segmented
markets imply that the markets for capital and output are segregated from each other at different
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In this paper, endogenous risk takes place as an amplification/mitigation (AM )
of exogenous systematic shocks.9 As in Brunnermeier and Sannikov (2016), our
model features the so called volatility paradox (see also Adrian and Brunnermeier,
2016), i.e. lower exogenous risk may lead to higher endogenous volatility, especially
when financial capitalisation is arbitrary low. Nevertheless, our model differs in
several substantial ways.
First, we account for both systematic and idiosyncratic risks as determinants
of aggregate fluctuations. This feature squares with empirical evidence suggest-
ing a relationship between macroeconomic dynamics and the state of the financial
system (Adrian et al., 2019). Second, in our model the effect of increasing idiosyn-
cratic risk leads to further leverage. This is because, after market segmentation,
the h/entrepreneurs increase their demand for risk-free bonds.10 Another relevant
element of our model is that equilibrium risk-free interest rates fluctuate over time
(and may take negative values) instead of being constant.11
As for LV, our paper moves along the seminal stream accounting for financial
frictions in general equilibrium (for a general discussion see Moritz and Taylor
(2012) and Brunnermeier et al. (2012)) and, more specifically, to those known as
post-crisis macro models (see Haven et al., 2016).
An important feature we share with this literature is the connection between
financial leverage and the amplification of shocks, originally modelled as a financial
accelerator.12
The idea of the financial cycle being determinants of the business cycle is
introduced in Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997). A similar setting with adjustment
costs on capital investment is in Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), and it is developed in
a New Keynesian setting by Bernanke et al. (1999). A more recent contributions
consecutive times, and the banks are the only ones allowed to produce new capital.
9Endogenous risk is generated by the allocation of wealth between different classes of agents
and channels by the leverage mechanism through which the financial sector pools risky claims.
The mechanism is introduced in Brunnermeier and Sannikov (2014) and has its roots in Hayashi
(1982), where the price of physical capital relates to investments.
10In Brunnermeier and Sannikov (2014), for instance, the opposite happens, because higher
idiosyncratic risks increase the borrowing cost of experts, and thus decrease their equilibrium
leverage.
11In Brunnermeier and Sannikov (2014) and Phelan (2016) instead, agents are risk neutral,
and thus the equilibrium risk-free rate equals the discount rate of the most conservative class of
agent.
12The financial accelerator mechanism works as follows: as investment demand increases, asset
price increases. Since the agents may use assets as collateral, this improves their balance sheet
condition, and so the external finance risk premium shrinks. This pushes forward demand for
investments and so on, thus generating amplification.
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is, among the others, Korinek and Simsek (2016). In their paper, they focus on
the effect of macro-prudential policies on the household leverage. Conversely, we
focus on the intermediaries side.13
Still concerning LV, the core difference between the aforementioned stream of
the literature and our paper consists of the source of frictions, market segmentation
in place of an agency problem, and thus of the nature of the amplification.
What follows is that the existence of uninsurable systematic risk is required
for amplification to take place (the idea is introduced in a theoretical setting by
Krishnamurthy, 2003). It is relevant to highlight that the core effect of introducing
financial frictions through occasionally binding constraint is that central theorems
of welfare do not hold, and the equilibrium risk allocation is inefficient (as for
example in Mendoza and Bianchi, 2010; Bianchi, 2011).14
From the asset pricing perspective (AP), our contribution has common char-
acteristics with the literature of general equilibrium models where financial cycles
and constraints determine asset prices, as for example He and Krishnamurthy
(2011, 2013).
These models are able to reproduce the observed rising Sharpe ratios and falling
risk-less interest rates during crises, but do not generate negative risk-free interest
rates.
Likewise, we match similar patterns when the financial sector is poorly capital-
ised. Besides, we consider a production rather then an exchange economy, thus we
can associate Sharpe ratios and interest rates to the dynamics of financial lever-
age, as well as consumption and business cycle fluctuations. Another important
difference in our model is that we do not need the constraint to be always binding
in order to generate those effects. Moreover, we explicitly micro-found the demand
for risk-free assets and show that in certain states of the world the real risk free
interest rate could be negative. In our model, this happens because markets are
incomplete. Accordingly, risk mitigation instruments are exclusively supplied by
financial intermediaries.
When the relative capitalization of the financial sector is too small, i.e. its
capital is scarce, intermediaries shall leverage heavily to supply risk-free assets
13Recent relevant papers in this field, that nevertheless do not consider idiosyncratic risk, are
Angeloni and Faia (2013), Angeloni et al. (2015), Ansgar (2016), Nuno and Carlos (2017) and
Rampini and Viswanathan (2017).
14We obtain a similar effect by market segmentation, yet suboptimal allocation is not contingent
and happens also when the constraint is slack. An interesting exercise discussing how to counter
pecuniary externality in a financial accelerator framework is in Korinek (2011). The paper
proposes a tax based disincentive to extreme leverage.
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to the households. For this reason, h/entrepreneurs are willing to pay -negative
risk-free rates- in order to avoid their exposure to idiosyncratic and systematic
shocks.
In light of the role of financial leverage and size as related to the business cycle,
BC, and risk-free interest rates during the crisis (see He et al., 2010), our results
relate to those papers at the intersection between finance and macroeconomics
treating systemic risk, as for example Nuno and Rey (2017).
With Nuno and Rey (2017) we share the trade-off between economic growth
and stability, although our mechanism of amplification is deeply different, and so
it is our definition of systemic crisis.15 In these terms, our model is similar to He
and Krishnamurthy (2019) where systemic risk is the conditional probability of
reaching binding constraint states. However, this is not the focus of our paper.
Finally, we investigate the relationship between the size of the financial sector,
leverage, and welfare (W ). We show that the h/entrepreneurs’ welfare dynamically
relates to the size of the financial sector, and so to its provision of risk-mitigation
via leverage. However, we show that either a small size (and high leverage) or
a large size of the financial sector could be detrimental for the welfare of h/en-
trepreneurs’. On this side, we are related to the work of Philippon (2010) that
studies the interaction between the financial and non-financial sectors, and invest-
igates whether it is optimal to subsidize or tax the former. Notwithstanding these
few common elements, our model is largely different, and so it is the role of the
financial sector. We also partially relate to the literature that investigates optimal
financial leverage constraints, and in particular to Phelan (2016) and Pancost and
Robatto (2018).
A common element between this work and Phelan (2016) is the relationship
between financial leverage constraints and welfare. His paper suggests that a
policy of recapitalizing banks, that mechanically decreases leverage to the optimal
level, is welfare-improving. This relates to the concept of welfare maximizing
size of the financial sector suggested by our model. Nevertheless, we strongly
differ with respect to several aspects. First, our model depicts counter-cyclical
rather then pro-cyclical leverage.16 Second, we introduce market segmentation as
15To Nuno and Rey (2017) systemic risk is the probability of intermediaries default whereas
in our model it can be interpreted as the probability of being below a certain capitalisation
threshold.
16This results is due to the fundamentally different nature of the financial intermediaries in our
models. Conversely, in Phelan (2016) the intermediaries are risk neutral and have a comparative
advantage at producing capital goods, in our model they are risk-averse, and have the role of
pooling idiosyncratic risky claims.
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a friction that allows us to model the demand for risk-free assets. Moreover, our
model displays a smooth dynamics rather then a step-wise process of aggregate
consumption. This allows us to relate financial leverage to the economic macro-
dynamics. Third, our equilibrium risk-free interest rate is not fixed. On the
contrary, it is state-dependent and may take negative values.
Similar to our setting, Pancost and Robatto (2018) consider the role of the
banks in providing risk pooling services as well as their role of supplying risk
mitigation instruments through deposits.17
Moreover, both our papers draw their conclusions by focusing on the h/en-
trepreneurs’ welfare, while do not (directly) consider the financial intermediar-
ies’ welfare. In this setting, we reach similar conclusion concerning the welfare
improvement that may come after imposing leverage constraints. However, our
papers differ substantially in several aspects. First, the focus of our paper is
on the relationship of financial sector leverage with the business cycle; for this
reason we consider both idiosyncratic and systematic shocks. Vice versa, Pancost
and Robatto (2018) consider only idiosyncratic shocks. Second, in Pancost and
Robatto (2018) the main objective is to determine the optimal capital requirement
regulation by exploiting the trade-off between good and bad risk taking.
In summary, the strength of our model and of its theoretical predictions is its
ability to jointly consider four very different dimensions: the role of systematic
and idiosyncratic risks, how their allocation relates to asset pricing and stems into
the amplification/mitigation of exogenous systematic shocks, the role of leverage
constraints for the dynamics of the financial sector capitalisation, and their effect
over the macroeconomic dynamics. In this term, the general equilibrium frame-
work allows us to disentangle the interlinks along these four dimensions. For this
reason, our model is unique in the literature.
2 The Model
In this section, we introduce the economic environment, together with the as-
sociated productive technologies, and describe the features of risky assets returns.
We then discuss the agents’ problem. We start the section with a narrative de-
scription of the model.
We consider a continuous-time infinite-horizon production economy with two
non-fungible goods: physical capital (such as a tree) and output (perishable good,
17A similar argument has been proposed by DeAngelo and Stulz (2015).
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such as apples). Each good is produced by a specific type of firms, the perishable
good acts as nume´raire. The capital producing business is inter-temporal and
risky. The perishable good producing business is non inter-temporal and risk-free.
There are two types of assets: risky claims and risk-free bonds. Risky claims are
written on the net revenues of capital-producing firms. The risk to which they are
exposed is both systematic (economy-wide) and idiosyncratic (firm-specific). Risk-
free bonds have value as risk-mitigation instruments and are in zero-net supply.
The economy is populated by two classes of agents: h/entrepreneurs and fin-
ancial intermediaries. Their risky assets holdings differ as follows. Financial inter-
mediaries are allowed to pool idiosyncratic risk and thus are exposed to systematic
risk only. The expected return on their risky assets is reduced by a cost of inter-
mediation for each unit of capital.18 Conversely, each entrepreneur is allowed to
invest in one capital producing firm only.
Since h/entrepreneurs do not pay the intermediation cost, they earn higher
expected returns. However, their over-exposure to idiosyncratic risk generates
positive demand for risk-mitigation instruments. As we shall see, in equilibrium,
this demand will be satisfied by the financial sector through its short position in
risk-free bonds, leading to leverage. This friction can be read as a market structure
where the set of investment opportunities available to each agent is tied up to the
class she belongs to.19,20
The share of risky claims that is left un-pooled, i.e. that remains in the hands of
the h/entrepreneurs’, determines the idiosyncratic risk allocation in the economy
and with it consumption, output, risky assets, and their prices in equilibrium. Key
parameters shall be the size of systematic and idiosyncratic risk, and intermedi-
ation costs.
18The intermediation cost can be thought as a reduced form that represents the administrative
costs that the intermediaries bear for screening and monitoring the firm activity, that instead
the entrepreneur observes, as well as for operational purposes.
19From the firms perspective, the limited access to financial markets is an exceedingly relevant
topic. For instance, Davydiuka et al. (2018) provide a theoretical model that motivates the
substantial decline of small firms going public in the last 20 years (as documented in Gao et al.,
2013) by the presence of increasing financial frictions, such as IPO and regulatory-disclosure
related costs.
20In Appendix B we show that, even if both h/entrepreneurs and financial intermediaries have
full access to pooled and un-pooled risky assets, there exists market segmentation (incomplete
market participation) as long as the intermediaries are more efficient at pooling claims than
h/entrepreneurs.
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2.1 Technologies and Risky Claims
There exist two types of firms: Type I has the inter-temporal role of generat-
ing new physical capital (trees) through a concave technology Φ(·) that uses the
perishable good (apples) as input. Let [0, 1] be a continuum of type I firms and
let dWt ⊥ ˜dW it ⊥ ˜dW jt ∀i 6= j, {i, j} ∈ [0, 1] be independent standard Brownian
motions defined on the filtered probability space (Ω,H,P), where {Ht, t > 0} is
the natural filtration over the measurable space (Ω,H). The capital stock kit ∈ R
managed by firm i ∈ [0, 1] follows a bi-variate Itoˆ diffusion
T it :
dkit
kit
=
(
Φ(ιit)− δ
)
dt+ σdWt + σ˜ ˜dWt
i, with Φ(ι) =
1
θ
log (1 + θι), (1)
where δ is the depreciation rate, ιit is the reinvestment rate as dependent on the
concavity parameter θ, σ and σ˜ are constant systematic and idiosyncratic diffusion
terms, respectively.21 We use qt to denote the equilibrium price of physical capital
in terms of the perishable good.
Firms of type I earn revenues by renting capital to firms of type II at the
instantaneous price pt. Firms of type II, also a continuum, do not have an inter-
temporal dimension, and produce perishable good yit through a linear production
function that has capital as input:
yit = Ak
i
t. (2)
The profit of the ith firm of type II at time t is thus simply (A− pt)kit.
Note that since production technologies are linear, firms break even and earn
no profits in equilibrium.22 The ownership of both types of firms is thus irrelevant.
In t, each firm of type I finances its activities by issuing risky claims with pay-off
in s = t+ dt equal to its net revenues. The return of firm i risky claim between t
and s = t+ dt is dRit.
2.2 Financial Sector and h/entrepreneurs
The economy is populated by h/entrepreneurs and financial intermediaries.
H/Entrepreneurs consist of a continuum of heterogeneous agents of unit mass
21The stochastic process driving the dynamics of physical capital can be interpreted as
stochastic depreciation (see Wa¨lde, 2011).
22Type I firm technology in non-linear in ι, however linearity in k is maintained through the
identification of c = ιk as expense for the perishable consumption, see Appendix A.
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h/entrepreneur ith ith Type I firm
Type II firm
Risky claim
Systematic+idiosyncratic risk
Physical capital
Perishable consumption
Physical capital
Figure 1: Micro-structure of production and risky claims for the h/entrepreneurs
H := [0, 1] indexed by h ∈ H. Similarly, the intermediaries belong to F := (1, 2]
and are indexed by f ∈ F. Since the latter are homogeneous, they can be accounted
for as a representative financial sector.
The ith agent has an initial endowment ki0 6= 0 such that her wealth equals
ei0 = k
i
0q0. In each time interval [t, t + dt), agent i consumes at a rate
cit
eit
and
allocates a fraction ωit of what is left to risky claims and a fraction (1 − ωit) to
risk-less bonds. All agents have log utility and discount the future at the same
rate ρ; they are infinitely lived and chose cit and ω
i
t to maximize their objective
function
V0 = max{cit,ωit}∈Bi
E0
[ˆ ∞
0
e−ρt ln citdt
]
, i = h, f (3)
subject to
Bit :
deit
eit
= ωitdR
i
t +
(
1− ωit
)
rtdt− c
i
t
eit
dt, (4)
where rt is the risk-free interest rate, and the i
th agent has access to a different
risky portfolio with return dRit.
23
The financial sector can invest the stock of physical capital at its disposal across
all firms, against the payment of an intermediation cost η per unit of capital.24
23The derivation of the solution is in Appendix C.1. With a slight abuse of notation we use
dRit to denote the return to the agent i of firm i = h, and dR
f
t to denote the return of the
aggregate portfolio that pools risky claims issued by all firms i ∈ [0, 1].
24A seminal paper that develops a theoretical framework where financial intermediation costs
associate to a net advantage due to diversification is Diamond (1984). In an economy where all
the agents are risk averse, the paper shows that financial intermediaries must have lower deleg-
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The intermediation cost can be thought as a reduced form that represents the
administrative costs that the intermediaries bear for screening and monitoring each
firm, which the entrepreneur instead observes, as well as for operational purposes.
Conversely, due to market segmentation, the h/entrepreneurs cannot diversify
among firms (risky claims): the ith entrepreneur can invest only in the ith firm.25
Firms are therefore financed by both h/entrepreneurs and financial intermedi-
aries that, in our framework, provide venture capital services.
Thus, the return on risky claim i, dRit, has the following structure:
dRit = µ
i
tdt︸︷︷︸
Expected return
− [1i=f ] η
qt
dt︸ ︷︷ ︸
Intermediation cost
+ σtdWt︸ ︷︷ ︸
Systematic risk
+ [1i=h] σ˜
˜dW it︸ ︷︷ ︸
Idiosyncratic risk
, (5)
where 1i is the indicator function. Note that the expected return µ
i
t and systematic
risk σt shall be determined in equilibrium as dependent on the firms’ optimizing
behaviour.
As we shall see, the portfolio choices of h/entrepreneurs’ and intermediaries’
in equilibrium will differ substantially, due to their asymmetric exposure to idio-
syncratic and systematic risks as well as to the expected returns of their risky
assets.
In particular, each entrepreneur will finance capital producing firms propor-
tionally to the share of its wealth that is not allocated in risk-free bonds. Anti-
thetically, intermediaries will finance firms by means of their own endowment plus
the stock of capital they acquire from the h/entrepreneurs versus the issuance of
risk-free bonds.
To synthetically represent the relationship between the ith entrepreneur and
the ith firm, in Figure 1 we depict the micro-structure of production from the
h/entrepreneurs’ perspective. Similarly, Figure 2 represents the mechanism by
which the financial sector may purchase a fraction of the h/entrepreneurs’ physical
capital versus the issuance of risk-free bonds.
It is relevant to highlight that market segmentation, which we have assumed
ation costs than an entrepreneur to viably provide intermediation services. This intermediaries
centralized monitoring structure will mean that there are not active markets for their pooled
assets. This relates to the concept of segmented financial markets, being the aggregate financial
sector the only one supplying risk-mitigation instruments. From an empirical perspective, the
side effect of risk pooling at financial institutions is treated, among the others, in Wolf (2010)
and van Oordt (2014).
25As we have already stressed, this assumption makes us closer to reality, where the majority
of SMEs have limited access to capital markets.
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Financial sector hth h/entrepreneur
∑
Physical Capital hth
Risk-free bond
Figure 2: The financial sector and its purchase of a fraction of the h/entrepreneurs’
physical capital versus the issuance of risk-free bonds.
to be an exogenous financial friction, may emerge in equilibrium in presence of
transaction costs on the h/entrepreneurs’ side to pool idiosyncratic risky assets.
In Appendix B we show that, even if both h/entrepreneurs and financial interme-
diaries have full access to risk-free bonds, as well as pooled and un-pooled risky
assets, there exists market segmentation as long as the intermediaries are more
efficient at pooling claims than h/entrepreneurs, and the transaction cost is not
too large.26
3 The Equilibrium Dynamics
In this section, we outline the main steps to derive the competitive equilibrium
of this economy.
First, in Section 3.1, we define the equilibrium, specify the associated return on
risky assets, and characterise the unique state variable: the relative capitalization
of the financial sector.
Second, in Section 3.2, we introduce and discuss the benchmark cases of the
full-risk-pooling economy, where the financial sector holds the whole capital stock,
as well as the no-risk-pooling economy, where there is no financial sector.
Henceforth, we denote all the aggregate variables with a capital letter.
26It is relevant to stress that the presence of capital markets is not self-sufficient to solve the
monitoring problem, as long as the transaction cost is higher for the h/entrepreneurs’ than for
the financial sector. See Diamond (1984).
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3.1 Competitive Equilibrium
Informally, the equilibrium consists of maps from histories of systematic shocks
to prices (capital prices, returns on risky claims, risk-free interest rates), produc-
tion choices and consumption choices, as well as asset allocations such that firms
maximise their profits, agents maximise their expected utility, and markets clear.
Formally:
Definition 1. Competitive Equilibrium
Conditional on an initial allocation of capital among the agents, an equilibrium
is an adapted stochastic process that maps histories of systematic shocks {dWt}
to prices {qt}, returns on risky claims
{
dRht , dR
f
t ;h ∈ H
}
, risk free rates {rt},
production choices {kit, ιit; i ∈ [0, 1]}, consumption choices
{
Cht , C
f
t ;h ∈ H
}
, and
asset allocations
{
ωht , ω
f
t ;h ∈ H
}
such that:
1. Firms maximise their profits:
(a) Firms of type I
{
kit, ι
i
t
} ∈ arg max
{kit,ιit}∈T i
{
Et
[
kisqse
´ s
t
pu−ιiu
qu
du
]
− kitqt
}
,∀i ∈ [0, 1]; (6)
(b) Firms of type II
kit ∈ arg max
kit≥0
{
(A− pt) kit
}
,∀i ∈ [0, 1]. (7)
2. Agents maximise their utility:
{
cit, ω
i
t
} ∈ arg max
{cit,ωit}∈Bi
E0
[ˆ ∞
0
e−ρt ln citdt
]
,∀i ∈ H ∪ F.
3. All markets clear:
(a) Risky asset ˆ
F
ωft e
f
t df +
ˆ
H
ωht e
h
t dh = Ktqt; (8)
(b) Bond ˆ
F
(1− ωft )eft df +
ˆ
H
(
1− ωht
)
eht dh = 0, (9)
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(c) Consumption
ˆ
F
(
A− ιft − η
)
kft df +
ˆ
H
(
A− ιht
)
kht dh = C
f
t + C
h
t ; (10)
(d) Capital ˆ
F
kft df +
ˆ
H
kht dh = Kt. (11)
An equilibrium snapshot of the agents’ balance sheet at any instant of time t
is in Figure 3. The dark grey boxes depict the asset allocation of each class of
agents while the light grey boxes represent their liabilities.
The financial sector holds a long (leveraged) position in the aggregate portfolio
of risky claims that is financed by both its own capital endowment
´
F e
fdf = Ef
plus a short position in risk-free bonds
(
ωf − 1)Ef (the former left-hand side ad-
dend of Equation 9). Conversely, each entrepreneur allocates its wealth between a
single risky asset and a risk-free bond (the former left-hand side addends of Equa-
tion 8 and 9, respectively). Market clearing conditions imply that risk-free bond
is in zero net supply (Equation 9) and financial sector capital and aggregate h/en-
trepreneurs’ wealth sum up to the aggregate wealth within the economy Ktqt at
any t (Equation 8). Accordingly, the stock of wealth that belongs to the aggregate
of entrepeneurs holds as
´
H e
hdh = Eh.
To place the last piece of the jigsaw, Figure 4 shows the balance sheet of
the jth capital producing firms at any time t. As for the h/entrepreneurs’ and
financial sector balance sheets in Figure 3, the dark grey box represents the value
of the firm’s assets, whereas the light grey ones depicts the value of its liabilities.
Basically, each capital producing firm is jointly financed by h/entrepreneurs’ and
financial intermediaries’ capital stock, that is they bear a fraction of all the risk
of the firm’s asset rather than financing them via debt security. Therefore, firms
neither do leverage nor default.
In summary, each firm collects physical capital from both h/entrepreneurs’ and
intermediaries’ (straight arrows) versus the issuance of risky claims written on its
net revenues (dashed arrows). In particular, the j firm gathers capital ωheh,j from
the jth entrepreneur as well as from the financial sector, that evenly finances the
continuum of capital producing firms, so that
´
F ω
fef,jdf =
´
J ω
fef,jdj = ωfEf .
The market price of the risky claim q and the dynamics of its returns, as related
to the firms’ optimal policies in (6) and (7), are discussed at length in Appendix
A. In the aggregate, the mass of capital under both types of firms’ management
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Financial Sector
LA
Bonds (ωf−1)Ef
Risky claims
ωfEf
Wealth Ef
hth h/entrepreneur
LA
Risky claim ωheh
Wealth eh
Bond (1− ωh)eh
Figure 3: Synthetic agents’ balance sheets at time t
sums up to the total stock of capital K within the economy, so that (11) holds.
To further characterise the dynamics of the competitive equilibrium in Defini-
tion 1, we shall restrict our search to the class of dynamically simple equilibria.27
Moreover, we look for equilibria where the stochastic process that drives the price
of physical capital qt is an Itoˆ diffusion.
Assumption 1. Price of Physical Capital Dynamics
The price of physical capital evolves as an Itoˆ diffusion:
dqt := qtµ
q
tdt− qtσqt dWt, (12)
where µqt and σ
q
t are Ht-adapted functions.
According to Assumption 1, the dynamics of capital price is not affected by
idiosyncratic shocks. Moreover, the minus sign to the diffusion term implies that
positive shocks to capital stock affect negatively the price of unit of capital in
consumption good.28
Before moving to the state variable and its dynamics, we characterize the equi-
librium dynamics of risky assets returns dRit and discuss the relationship between
the expected returns of risky assets held by financial sector and h/entrepreneurs.
To do so we derive the optimal decisions of firms.
27The equilibrium is dynamically simple, i.e. it is time homogeneous and Markov in the state
variable and it is such there exists an associated ergodic distribution. For a formal definition see
Duffie et al. (1994)
28This choice is fundamental, as we shall see in the proof of Theorem 1 there does not exist
an equilibrium with Covt
[
dkit, dqt
]
> 0.
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jth Type I Firm
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Intermediaries’
capital ωfef,jPhysical
capital kjq
h/entrepreneurs’
capital ωheh,j
ith h/entrepreneur
Financial sector
Risky claims
Figure 4: Synthetic balance sheet of the jth capital producing firms at time t
As already introduced in Section 2.1, the firms in charge of producing new
capital dispose of the physical stock of agents kit, and rent it to the firms of type
II that use it to produce output by the technology in Equation (2) at a price pt.
Since the marginal productivity of type II firms is constant, the equilibrium rental
rate is also constant, pt = A. Firms of type I decide how much perishable good
Yt to demand for generating new capital. Both components gives rise to the firm
i dividend yield term of µit:
A− ιit
qt
.
The dividend yield represents the share of the asset expected return paid in value
of consumption and not re-invested to generate new capital at t+ dt.
Aside the dividend yield there is the capital gain obtained by the resale value
of capital. By Itoˆ’s Lemma, given the law of motion of kit in (1) and the dynamics
of qt in (12), the gain on capital stock value of the i
th agent evolves according to:
d (kitqt)
kitqt
=
(
Φ(ιit)− δ + µqt − σqtσ
)
dt+ (σ − σqt ) dWt + σ˜ ˜dW it ,
where ιit is the fraction of total output demanded to generate new capital and Φ(·)
is the investment function. Firm type-I profit maximization implies that ιit and qt
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satisfy the first order condition
Φ′(ιit) = Φ
′(ιjt) =
1
qt
, (13)
for every couple of firms i, j.
Wrapping up, it can be shown that (see Appendix A) the total return on the
ith claim follows the dynamics in equation (5) with
µit = µt :=
A− ιt
qt︸ ︷︷ ︸
Dividend Yield
+ Φ(ιt)− δ + µqt − σσqt︸ ︷︷ ︸
Capital Gain
, (14)
and
σt := σ − σqt .
By equations (5) and (14), the expected return on risky assets of h/entrepren-
eurs is higher than for the financial sector, and so it is the associated risk. The
difference is the intermediation cost ηKft that the financial sector must pay in order
to pool idiosyncratic risks σ˜ from different type I firms. The result is summarised
in the following Lemma:
Lemma 1. Expected Return Gap
In equilibrium, the expected return on risky assets of h/entrepreneurs and financial
sector, µht and µ
f
t respectively, are related by
Et[dRht ]
dt︸ ︷︷ ︸
µht
=
Et[dRft ]
dt︸ ︷︷ ︸
µft
+
η
qt
.
The gap is increasing in the intermediation η and decreasing in the price level
qt.
In order to derive the equilibrium, we express optimal portfolios, drift, and
diffusion of the stochastic process in (12) as functions of financial sector relative
wealth share ψt, defined as follows:
Definition 2. Relative Financial Capitalization
Let ψt be the financial sector’s share of total capital value. Conversely, (1 − ψt)
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represents the h/entrepreneurs’ share of total capital value:
ψt :=
Eft
Ktqt
, 1− ψt := E
h
t
Ktqt
.
As we shall see, all relevant equilibrium quantities can be written as a function
of ψt (see Appendix C.2).
We now have all the ingredients to derive the dynamics of the state variable ψt
at a competitive equilibrium. Moreover, we outline the conditions such that both
classes of agents survive, i.e. there exists an ergodic density of the financial sector
relative wealth share. Our results are summarised in the following theorem:
Theorem 1. Relative Capitalization Dynamics
Given the law of motion of q in (12), there exists a unique (Markov) competitive
equilibrium and it is characterized by the following:
1. The relative capitalization dynamics follows the diffusion process
dψt = ψtσ
2
t
[(
ωft − 1
)2
− ψt
σ2t
η
qt
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
ψtµ
ψ
t (ψt,qt)
dt+ ψtσt
(
ωft − 1
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
ψtσ
ψ
t (ψt,qt)
dWt. (15)
2. The associated dynamics of price qt(ψt) satisfies Assumption 1 with{
σqt = −q,ψσψt
µqt = Aq(ψ)
, (16)
where q,ψ is the physical capital price elasticity to financial sector relative
wealth share and A is the characteristic operator.
3. As long as the intermediation cost η is positive and not too high, the left-hand
side and right hand side boundaries, ψ = 0 and ψ = 1, are never attainable,
η ∈
(
0, σ˜2
1 + θA
1 + θρ+ θσ˜2
)
⇒ ψt ∈ (0, 1) ∀t ∈ (0,∞), (17)
and there exists a unique (non trivial) ergodic density pi(ψ).
4. When the intermediation cost η lays outside the interval in (17), then the
economy drifts either to the right-hand or to the left-hand side boundary,
respectively. In particular:
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(a) Full-risk-pooling economy,
η = 0⇒ µψt > 0⇒ lim
t→∞
ψt = 1 P− a.s.;
(b) No-risk-pooling economy,
η > σ˜2
1 + θA
1 + θρ+ θσ˜2
⇒ µψt < 0⇒ lim
t→∞
ψt = 0 P− a.s.
Proof. Points 1 and 2 are proved in Appendix C.3. The characteristic operator
A is defined in Øksendal (2003). Points 3, together with the characterization
of the ergodic density, are discussed in Appendix C.4. Point 4 (a) is proved by
setting η = 0 in the consumption market clearing condition (42). It follows that
µqt = σ
q
t = 0. By point 1, µ
ψ
t > 0 and thus, ψt → 1 when t → ∞. Point 4 (b) is
proved similarly.
The core implication of Theorem 1 is that we are able to express the dynamics
of all relevant equilibrium variables in the model as a function of the dynamics of
the relative capitalization ψt as expressed in point 1. Such dynamics depends also
on the dynamics of the price of physical capital, qt, as assumed in Assumption 1.
Given the relation between the two dynamics in point 2, we can solve for their
drift and diffusion numerically.29
Another important result is that, provided intermediation costs are neither too
low nor too high, the relative capitalization keeps floating around its long-run
average where both classes of agents have positive relative capitalization (point 3).
In this sense, heterogeneity is persistent.30
Instead, when intermediation costs are either null or too high (depending on
the size of idiosyncratic volatility), the economy collapses in one of two ”extreme”
cases: the full-risk-pooling economy and the no-risk-pooling economy (point 4).
In the intermediate case where both classes of agents coexist, henceforth an
economy with partial risk pooling, it is interesting to outline the way exogenous
systematic shocks affect equilibrium prices and relative wealth share dynamics
altogether.
29See Appendix C.2 for details.
30Note that the long-run dynamics of ψt does not necessary coincide with the associated
deterministic steady state where the drift is null. A discussion upon the relationship between
steady-state and long-term average of the stochastic process describing the equilibrium is in
Klimenko et al. (2017).
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To illustrate this relationship, in Figure 5 we plot the price level qt (left) as
well as the associated drift (centre) and diffusion (right) of the financial sector
relative capitalization (blue) and prices (red) dynamics as a function of the relative
financial capitalization ψ ∈ (0, 1).31
As far as the capital prices level is concerned, the larger the relative size of
the financial sector the lower the price of physical capital (Figure 5, left). This
negative relation is due to the higher incidence of the costs of intermediation
on the average productivity of capital when the financial sector is large. For
example, in the extreme case where the financial sector manages all the capital,
the intermediation cost is paid on all units of capital.
In general, positive exogenous systematic shocks shift the size ψt (and thus qt)
to the right towards one (minimum q(1)), because in equilibrium, due to leverage
and risk pooling, the total return of the financial sector portfolio is higher than the
return of the h/entrepreneurs. The opposite occurs for negative shocks. Import-
antly, the response of the relative size and capital price dynamics to exogenous
shocks is state dependent, especially in the neighbourhood of the boundaries.32
When the financial sector capitalization is small, its drift is positive (negative for
qt). As we shall see this is the result of high leverage and high Sharpe ratio. When
the financial sector capitalization is big enough, instead, the drift of its relative
capitalization is negative (positive for qt). This is because the benefit of lever-
age are reduced (lower Sharpe ratio) while the costs associated to intermediation
(proportional to η/qt) are higher. Overall, the relative capitalization of the finan-
cial sector shrinks (while qt increase). The central panel of Figure 5 provides an
illustration.
Such dynamics is associated with a volatility that is maximal for quite low level
of capitalization. This is a direct effect of leverage which amplifies external shocks.
31We solve the model numerically by assuming the following baseline parameters: A = 0.5,
δ = 0.05, σ˜ = 0.6, σ = 0.2, η = 0.1, θ = 2, and ρ = 0.05. According to Ang et al. (2006) and
Fangjian (2009), reasonable values for the annualized systematic and idiosyncratic volatilities are
approximately 0.2 and 0.55, respectively. The remaining parametric specification is close to the
one in Brunnermeier and Sannikov (2016) Despite these choices do not come after calibration,
they produce reasonable qualitative outcomes. To verify the model robustness, in Appendix E
we discuss the changes of equilibrium dynamics with respect to the key parameters in the model,
namely the size of systematic and idiosyncratic risk as well as intermediation costs.
32It is important to stress that in our economy both classes of agents are equally risk averse and
discount the future at the same rate. These assumptions, together with bonds in zero net supply
and h/entrepreneurs’ idiosyncratic risk exposure, imply that there does not exist an equilibrium
where the financial sector purchases risk-free bonds, i.e. ωft ≥ 1 (the financial sector is always
leveraged).
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Figure 5: Left: Price level q(ψ). Centre, right: Drift (centre) and diffusion (right) of
the financial sector relative capitalization (blue) and prices (red) dynamics as a function
of ψ ∈ (0, 1). Baseline parameters: A = 0.5, δ = 0.05, σ˜ = 0.6, σ = 0.2, η = 0.1, θ = 2,
and ρ = 0.05.
Figure 5, right panel. In Appendix E, we shall also show how drift and diffusion
change with idiosyncratic risk σ˜ and systematic risk σ. When the financial sector
is small (high leverage) they both increase with σ˜ (the higher the risk, the higher
the demand for risk mitigation, the higher the leverage) and decrease with σ (the
higher the systematic risk, the lower the Sharpe ratio, the lower the leverage).
The last result is consistent with the volatility paradox: due to leverage, a lower
systematic risk increase fluctuations.
3.2 The Benchmarks
In this section, we introduce the two extreme cases that act as the benchmarks
of our analysis. The former is the no-risk-pooling economy, where the h/entre-
preneurs hold all the capital and market segmentation plays a big role. The latter
is the full-risk-pooling economy, where the financial sector holds the whole stock
of physical capital and market segmentation plays no role.
No-risk-pooling The equilibrium at the left-hand side boundary (ψ = 0) implies
a constant price of physical capital q(0) (in fact µq(0) = σq(0) = 0), investment
ι(0), risk-free interest rates r(0), risky claim return µh(0), and their Sharpe ratio
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ξh(0). In particular,
q (0) =
1 + θA
1 + θρ
, ι(0) =
q(0)− 1
θ
=
A− ρ
1 + θρ
, r (0) = ρ+ Φ(ι(0))− δ − σ2 − σ˜2,
µh(0) =
A− ι(0)
q(0)
+ Φ(ι(0))− δ, ξh(0) =
A−ι(0)
q(0)
+ σ2 + σ˜2 − ρ
√
σ2 + σ˜2
.
In this economy markets are utterly segmented. Financial intermediaries do not
supply any risk-mitigation instrument to the economy and each entrepreneur has
full exposure to its idiosyncratic shocks. The equilibrium interest rate is lower
than how it would be with a financial sector, and it is such that, in absence of
risk mitigation assets, agents are happy to invest their wealth in risky claims only.
High value of q decrease the dividend yield (but increase the capital gain due to
higher investment) and decrease also the Sharpe ratio. The latter depends also on
systematic and idiosyncratic risk. Although both increase risk, they also decrease
the risk-free rate and thus, overall, increase the equilibrium Sharpe ratio.
In this benchmark, the aggregate output (perishable good) Yt follows a Geo-
metric Brownian Motion (GBM). The same holds for the capital stock (due to the
linearity of type II technology) and for aggregate consumption:
dYt
Yt
∣∣∣∣
ψ=0
=
dCt
Ct
∣∣∣∣
ψ=0
=
dKt
Kt
= [Φ(ι(0))− δ] dt+ σdWt.
Although aggregate output and consumption are moved only by the systematic
shocks, each entrepreneur individual consumption bears its uninsured idiosyncratic
risk leading to a low welfare.
Full-risk-pooling The full-risk-pooling economy is reachable when the cost of
intermediation equals zero, unless the obvious case when the financial sector is
endowed with the whole aggregate wealth at t = 0 so that ψ0 = 1. Also this
equilibrium implies a constant price of physical capital q (1), investment ι(1), risk-
free interest rates r(1), risky claim return µh(1), and their Sharpe ratio ξh(1).33
33Also this equilibrium is a special case of John Cox and Ross (1985).
26
In particular, we have:
q(1) =
1 + θ (A− η)
1 + θρ
, ι(1) =
A− ρ− η
1 + θρ
, r (1) = ρ+ Φ(ι(1))− δ − σ2,
µf (1) =
A− ι(1)− η
q(1)
+ Φ(ι(1))− δ, ξf (1) =
A−ι(1)−η
q(1)
+ σ2 − ρ
σ
.
Note that when η > 0 capital prices and investment are lower: q(1) < q(0) implies
ι(1) < ι(1). Interest rates are higher, r(1) > r(0), due to the fact that the financial
sector can diversify all the idiosyncratic risk and thus has a zero demand/supply
of risk mitigation for higher rates than when h/entrepreneurs are alone. Positive
intermediation costs imply instead that capital is less productive (some resources
are lost by the intermediation process) and its equilibrium prices is lower. Lower
prices imply also lower investment and thus lower drift, a pecuniary externality
of the high intermediation costs. Risk premia, and so Sharpe ratios, are also a
function of capital prices. A low capital price implies a higher dividend yield and
a lower capital gain (lower investment). The Sharpe ratio is also lower due to
higher interest rates.
Also in this benchmark the output follows a GBM, the same process followed
by total consumption and the capital stock:
dYt
Yt
∣∣∣∣
ψ=1
=
dCt
Ct
∣∣∣∣
ψ=1
=
dKt
Kt
= [Φ(ι(1))− δ] dt+ σdWt.
With positive intermediation cost, η > 0, the growth rate of output, capital, and
consumption is lower in the full-risk-pooling economy than in the no-risk-pooling
case. Nevertheless, in both cases the aggregate volatility is state independent and
equals σ. The same process is followed also by the disposable output Y˜ , defined
as the output net of intermediation costs: Y˜t = Yt − ηKt = (A− η)Kt.
In the next section we focus to the dynamics of the macro-variables in the in-
termediate case of partial-risk-pooling where the h/entrepreneurs and the financial
sector coexist.
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Figure 6: Top: Drift (left) and diffusion (right) of the equilibrium process dψ as a
function of ψ. Bottom: Equilibrium leverage ωf and risk-free interest rates r as a
function of ψ. In red, the benchmark cases of full-risk-pooling (solid) and no-risk-pooling
(dashed). Baseline parameters: A = 0.5, δ = 0.05, σ˜ = 0.6, σ = 0.2 η = 0.1, θ = 2 and
ρ = 0.05.
4 Real and Financial Macro-dynamics
In this section, we describe the equilibrium dynamics of leverage and macro-
variables when intermediation costs are positive, so that the financial sector does
not dominate, but not too high, so that the condition (17) of Theorem 1 is satisfied
and the financial sector capitalization stays positive. We shall characterise this case
of partial-risk-pooling as a deviation from the benchmarks of full-risk-pooling (and
positive intermediation cost) and no-risk-pooling discussed in the previous section.
The discussion is structured as follows. First, in Section 4.1 we investigate the
mechanism that links the fluctuations of the financial sector relative wealth share
to financial leverage and risk-free interest rates. Second, in Section 4.2 we study
how those fluctuations affect real macro-variables, such as aggregate consumption
and disposable output. More specifically, we focus on the relationship between the
volatility of those variables and the exogenous systematic volatility σ, conditional
on the financial sector relative capitalization ψ.
Finally, in Section 4.3, we discuss the relationship between leverage, Sharpe
ratios, and risk-free interest rates.
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4.1 Leverage and Risk-free Rates
Having solved for the competitive equilibrium, we are able to address sev-
eral questions upon the theoretical implications of our model, namely: how does
financial leverage react and modifies positive and negative exogenous systematic
shocks, respectively? What is the relationship connecting the financial sector rel-
ative wealth share, and thus financial leverage, to risk-free interest rates?
Figure 6 illustrates the drift (top-left) and diffusion (top-right) of the equilib-
rium relative wealth share level dψt over the state-space ψ ∈ (0, 1). In red, we
show the benchmark cases of the full-risk-pooling (solid) and the no-risk-pooling
(dashed) economy. In the same figure (bottom row), we plot the financial leverage
ωf (right) and the risk-free interest rate r (left) as a function of ψ.
Financial leverage The financial sector leverage, ωf , is a decreasing function of ψ
because the smaller the financial sector, the higher the demand of risk mitigation,
the larger the leverage (Figure 6, bottom left). As shown in Appendix C.2, in
equilibrium it holds
ωft =
1
ψt
(
1− (1− ψt)µt − rt
σ2t
)
. (18)
Since in equilibrium leverage cannot be larger than 1
ψ
, which occurs when the fin-
ancial sector holds all risky claims, the diminished financial sector leverage reflects
its risk aversion. Note that, despite leverage is decreasing in ψ, the total holding
of the financial sector, ωfψ is increasing in ψ, consistently with the equilibrium
nature of the model.
How does leverage changes with exogenous shocks? As confirmed by Theorem
1, positive (negative) exogenous systematic shocks deteriorate the financial sector
assets and move its size towards one (zero). Stated differently, the diffusion term
σψ contributes positively to the size law of motion, see the top-right panel of Figure
6. The latter together with the fact that ωf is a decreasing function of ψ, imply
that negative shocks increase equilibrium leverage. This is the result of a relatively
higher demand for risk-mitigation instruments by the h/entrepreneurs. The op-
posite holds as a response to positive shocks: when the financial sector increases its
relative wealth share, its leverage reduces, and its supply of risk-mitigation instru-
ments decreases. Since financial leverage is convex in ψ, conditional on the state,
increments of leverage are more than proportional with respect to reductions.
Overall, the size of the financial sector is pro-cyclical and financial leverage is
counter-cyclical as also suggested by the recent empirical findings in Yepez (2017)
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and He et al. (2017).
Given that σt increases in σ, leverage in (18) is decreasing in the systematic
volatility σ -the lower the systematic risk, the higher the risky claim demand of
the financial sector, the higher the equilibrium leverage- and increasing in the idio-
syncratic risk volatility σ˜ -the higher the idiosyncratic risk, the higher the demand
for risk mitigation, the higher the leverage. Appendix E provides a graphical rep-
resentation of the result. Given that financial leverage is associated with high
fluctuations of the financial sector size, decreasing systematic risks also increases
the relative size fluctuations, an effect consistent with the volatility paradox.
As we shall see, leverage is the core driver of several of our results. In fact,
due to its one-to-one relationship with the relative size of the financial sector, its
is equivalent to express the equilibrium as a function of either variable.
Risk-free interest rates As far as the equilibrium risk-free interest rate rt is con-
cerned (see Figure 6, bottom row, right), the risk-free return on bonds is increasing
in financial sector wealth share, due to a declining demand/increasing supply of
mitigation instruments, making interest rates are pro-cyclical.
For low value of financial sector capitalization, r turns negative. Since both
sides are equally risk-averse, with a high demand/low supply of bonds, h/entre-
preneurs are willing to pay the financial sector to oﬄoad some of their risky claims
to its balance sheet. The effect does not require any “crisis” contingency to take
place, rather it is generated by market segmentation jointly with the allocation of
capital and risk among heterogeneous classes of agents.
Finally note that the full-risk-pooling r(1) and the no-risk-pooling r(0) act as
the upper and lower bound for the risk-free rate dynamics (bottom right panel of
Fig. 6).
4.2 Consumption and the Business Cycle
The relationship between the size of the financial sector, its leverage, and the
business cycle is a long-standing issue. In particular, there are several studies
exploring the connection between the size of the financial system and intermedi-
ation to output and consumption growth and growth volatility. In Denizer et al.
(2002), for example, countries with more developed financial sectors are shown to
experience less fluctuations in output, consumption, and investment growth. More
recently, Beck et al. (2014) show that intermediation activities increase growth and
reduce volatility in the long-run. Nevertheless, they argue that an over-sized fin-
30
ancial sector could result in miss-allocation of resources. What follows is that the
over-development of auxiliary financial services may lead the financial sector to
grow too large relative to its social optimum.
In the light of these empirical findings, we use our theoretical results to high-
light the mechanism that relates the size of the financial sector to the equilibrium
behaviour of real macro-variables such as aggregate consumption and disposable
output.
In equilibrium, the aggregate output Yt can be decomposed as the sum of
consumption Ct, investments It, and what is spent as intermediation costs due to
pooling, Gt. We denote as disposable output Y˜t the fraction of total output that is
either consumed or invested to generate new capital, Y˜t = Ct + It, or, equivalently,
Y˜t = Yt−Gt. Y˜t is the share of output that contributes at generating welfare. The
dynamics of total output is
dYt = AdKt = dCt + dIt︸ ︷︷ ︸
dY˜t
+dGt.
where Gt = ηψtKt, It = ιtKt and thus Ct = (A− ιt − ηψt)Kt.
For the purpose of our analysis, we focus on consumption and disposable output
only.34 In particular (see Appendix C.7), it is possible to show that the dynamics
of disposable output and consumption growth rates evolve as Itoˆ’s processes whose
drifts (µY˜t and µ
C
t ) as well as diffusions (σ
Y˜
t and σ
C
t ) are function of both state ψt
and prices qt.
Disposable output In Figure 7 we plot the drift (left) and the normalized dif-
fusion (right) of the (aggregate) disposable output growth process dY˜
Y
. In red, we
depict the benchmark cases of the full-risk-pooling (solid) and the no-risk-pooling
(dashed) economy.
Despite both drift and diffusion depend on the financial sector relative wealth
share and they always remain within the bounds set by the two benchmarks.
In particular, µY˜ is decreasing in ψ (increasing in financial leverage), whereas
the (normalized) diffusion term σ
Y˜
σ
is a convex function of the financial relative
capitalization ψ.
In our model, the output drift is decreasing in the relative size of the financial
sector due to a pecuniary externality : the larger the financial sector capitalization,
the lower the aggregate productivity of capital (due to high intermediation costs
34The dynamics dIt and dGt are reported in Appendix C.7.
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per unit of capital), the lower the cost of capital, the lower the investment in new
capital.
The reduction of output volatility implies that σY˜ can be read as a mitigation
with respect to the width of exogenous fluctuations due to the volatility of capital
stock σ. This feature highlights a positive externality of the financial sector activ-
ity: having a large fraction of idiosyncratic risks that are pooled by the financial
sector implies that capital is less productive (due to intermediation costs) and
thus, being the size of the financial sector positively related to capital, a negative
relationship between capital and its productivity. The latter decreases the size of
capital growth rates fluctuations as driven by systematic shocks.
Lemma 2. Mitigation The diffusion terms of disposable output growth can be
written as mitigation with respect to the exogenous systematic shocks volatility σ.
In particular
σY˜t (ψt) = σ
1−
(
σψt
σ
)
ηψt
A− ψtη︸ ︷︷ ︸
Mitigation
 . (19)
In Figure 7 we plot the drift (left) and the normalized diffusion (right) of the
(aggregate) disposable output growth process dY˜
Y
. In red, we depict the benchmark
cases of the full-risk-pooling (solid) and the no-risk-pooling (dashed) economy. As
far as the mitigation is concerned, the right panel shows that the mitigation is
a concave function of ψ. Indeed, the negative correlation between (A − ηψ) and
K implies that the mitigation is maximal when the volatility σψ is high, i.e., for
relative small values of the financial sector size. As far as output fluctuations are
concerned, this suggests that there exists an optimal size of the financial sector.
The mitigation of disposable output volatility σY˜ with respect to σ is in line
with the empirical findings in Beck et al. (2014) suggesting that, in the long-run,
intermediation-based services positively associate with growth and negatively with
growth volatility (see Figure 7).35
Consumption To understand the connection between financial relative wealth
share and the dynamics of consumption, in the top panels of Figure 8 we plot
35Conversely, non-intermediation services increase the output volatility of high income coun-
tries. Nevertheless, the role that intermediation and non-intermediation financial activities play
in the growth process of countries is not yet fully disentangled.
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Figure 7: Diffusion (left) and normalized diffusion (right) of the (aggregate) disposable
output growth rate dY˜
Y˜
. In red, the benchmark cases of the full-risk-pooling (solid) and
the no-risk-pooling (dashed) economy. Baseline parameters: A = 0.5, δ = 0.05, σ˜ = 0.6,
σ = 0.2, η = 0.1, θ = 2, and ρ = 0.05.
Figure 8: Top: Drift (left) and normalized diffusion (right) of the equilibrium aggregate
consumption growth rate dCC as a function of ψ. Middle: Drift (left) and normalized
volatility (right) of the financial sector consumption growth rate dc
f
cf
∝ def
ef
as a function
of ψ. Bottom: Drift (left) and normalized volatility (right) of the h/entrepreneurs’
consumption growth rate dc
h
ch
∝ deh
eh
as a function of ψ. In red, the benchmark cases of the
full-risk-pooling (solid) and the no-risk-pooling (dashed) economy. Baseline parameters:
A = 0.5, δ = 0.05, σ˜ = 0.6, σ = 0.2 η = 0.1, θ = 2 and ρ = 0.05.
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the drift (left) and the normalized diffusion (right) of the aggregate consumption
growth rate dCt
C
as a function of the state ψ ∈ (0, 1). In the same figure, we
plot the drift and the normalized diffusion of the consumption growth rate process
for the financial sector (centre panel) and the h/entrepreneurs’ (bottom panel),
respectively. In red, we depict the benchmark cases of the full-risk-pooling (solid)
and the no-risk-pooling (dashed) economy.
In the aggregate, the financial sector relative wealth share negatively affects the
drift consumption µC . Moreover, as long as ψ is small enough, the consumption
drift lays above the upper benchmark where ψ = 0 (Figure 8, top left panel). This
result is mainly due the pecuniary externalities : when the financial sector man-
ages capital, it reduces aggregate productivity, making physical capital relatively
cheaper. The fact, that the dynamics of physical capital prices q inversely relates
to the dynamics of ψ implies that lower financial relative wealth share (higher
financial leverage) relates to higher prices, investments, and thus consumption
growth.36
As far as consumption volatility is concerned, as long as ψ is small enough,
consumption volatility is amplified whereas it is mitigated when the financial sector
is relatively well capitalised.
Lemma 3. Amplification and Mitigation The diffusion terms of aggregate
consumption growth can be written as amplification and mitigation with respect to
the exogenous systematic shocks volatility σ. In particular
σCt (ψt) = σ
1 + 1θ σqtσ qtA− ιt − ψtη︸ ︷︷ ︸
Amplification
− σ
ψ
t
σ
ηψt
A− ιt − ψtη︸ ︷︷ ︸
Mitigation
 ; (20)
Perhaps the most compelling feature is that σC can be decomposed as the sum
of an amplification plus a mitigation term. It follows that the magnitude of con-
sumption volatility with respect to σ depends on what component dominates: the
endogenous term in Equation (20) amplifies the consumption fluctuations after
exogenous shocks when ψ is low, i.e. financial leverage is high. The fluctuations
of aggregate consumption capture here the fluctuations of investment (through
capital prices). At the same time, aggregate consumption fluctuations are mit-
igates them when the financial sector is well capitalised (top-right panel), an ef-
fect of reduced volatility of output. This result is consistent with Denizer et al.
36We remind that in our model ι ∝ q.
34
(2002), whose empirical findings suggest that risk management services provided
by financial intermediaries may be particularly important in reducing consumption
volatility.
The other panels consider separately the growth rates of h/entrepreneurs and
financial sector consumption. Both drift and volatility of financial sector consump-
tion growth declines with its size. The larger the financial sector, the lower the
drift, implying a decrease of its relative wealth growth rate (affecting the drift),
and a decrease of fluctuations (affecting the volatility). A somehow similar effect
occurs for the volatility of consumption growth rates of h/entrepreneurs consump-
tion. Here, however, idiosyncratic risks play a big role: the larger the financial
sector, the lower the share of idiosyncratic risk not pooled by it, the lower the
entrepreneur consumption growth rate volatility. The drift is first sharply declin-
ing in the financial sector size, reflecting the shape of h/entrepreneurs wealth drift
when the financial sector is small, and the slowly increasing when the financial
sector is too large.
4.3 Financial Leverage and Asset Pricing
Now that we have drawn our main theoretical results concerning the relation-
ship between the financial sector relative wealth share and the macro dynamics, we
focus on the interlink between financial leverage and and financial assets returns,
their Sharpe ratios, and risk-free rates. We discuss our results in light of some
stylized facts: i) Risk-free rates are pro-cyclical (Fatih Guvenen, 2006) ii) As long
as agents are able to adjust their leverage, Sharpe ratios are counter-cyclical, i.e.
assets that covary with leverage are riskier and earn a proportionally larger risk
premium (Adrian et al., 2014; Dell’Ariccia et al., 2014).37
To study how financial leverage relates to asset pricing, in Figure 9 we plot the
financial sector risky assets expected returns 1
dt
E
[
dRf
]
= µf (bottom, left) and
volatility 1
dt
√
Var [dRf ] = σf (bottom, right) as a function of ωf . In red, we show
the benchmark cases of maximum (solid) and minimum (dashed) leverage.
In the same Figure (top, right) we plot the Sharpe ratios of the financial sector
ξf (blue, solid) and of the h/entrepreneurs’ ξh (blue, dashed) as a function of ωf .
What stands out is that Sharpe ratios are increasing with financial leverage.
Accordingly to what we discussed in Section 4.1, that there exists a negative
relationship between the financial sector relative wealth share and its leverage,
since financial leverage is counter-cyclical, so it is the corresponding Sharpe ratio.
37A similar argument, from a theoretical perspective, is in Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2008).
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Figure 9: Top left: Sharpe ratios (left) financial sector ξf (blue, solid) and of the
h/entrepreneurs’ ξh (blue, dashed). Top right: Risk-free interest rate (right) as a function
of financial leverage ωf . Bottom: Financial risky assets expected return µf (left) and
diffusion σf (right) as a function of financial leverage ωf . Bottom: Sharpe ratio ξR
(left) and risk-free interest rates (right) as a function of financial leverage. In red,
the benchmark cases of maximum (solid) and minimum (dashed) leverage. Baseline
parameters: A = 0.5, δ = 0.05, σ˜ = 0.6, σ = 0.2, η = 0.1, θ = 2, and ρ = 0.05.
This is because, as long as the financial sector is free to adjust its leverage, its
assets covary with leverage, they are riskier, and thus earn a larger risk premium.
The plot also clarifies that Sharpe ratios faced by the entrepreneur (and including
idiosyncratic risk) are lower than those faced by the financial sector, consistently
with the opposite position that they have in the bond market.
Accordingly, risk-free interest rates being decreasing in ωf (Figure 9, top, right),
are pro-cyclical. This is because, in our model, high leverage corresponds to scarce
financial capitalization, and so a scarce supply of risk-free bonds.
In this term, the link between financial leverage Sharpe ratios, and interest
rates strictly relates to the pooling capacity of the financial sector, and can be
decomposed into two different components. First, higher financial leverage cor-
responds to lower (even negative, depending on the parameters) interest rates.
Second, higher leverage corresponds to higher aggregate marginal productivity,
and thus higher risky assets returns, since a smaller share of aggregate wealth is
spent after pooling.
Note that the size of idiosyncratic risks contribute also to the financial sector
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risk premia despite the fact they can be pooled, and therefore eliminated via
diversification. This is due to the assumption of market segmentation as well as
to agents’ risk aversion. In fact, the h/entrepreneurs exposure to idiosyncratic
risk, jointly with their share of the aggregate wealth, determines the aggregate
demand of risk-free bonds, and so the equilibrium financial leverage. As long as
there exists residual (un-pooled) idiosyncratic risk, that is accounted for in the
equilibrium risk-free rates.
A further interesting implication of our model is that, unlike He and Krish-
namurthy (2013), there is no need of binding constraints to link financial leverage
to Sharpe ratios: in this terms, it is an inherent effect of financial intermediation.
The connection between higher risk premia and limited participation models
is well known (see Fatih Guvenen, 2006), and dates back to Basak and Cuoco
(1998).38 Our contribution is to implement the aforementioned mechanism in a
fully-fledged general equilibrium model of a production economy and, in particular,
to draw the relationship between financial and real macro-dynamics.
5 Leverage and Welfare
In this section, we study how the relative capitalization of the financial sector,
and so its leverage, relates to the agents’ welfare. First, in Section 5.1 we derive the
welfare of the h/entrepreneurs’ as well as of the financial sector, both conditional
on an initial financial sector size and unconditionally, using the ergodic distribution
of the state to weight the possible outcomes.
Second, in Section 5.2 we explore the effect of a static leverage constraint on
the macroeconomic dynamics, and so on both classes of agents’ as well as on the
aggregate welfare.
Finally, being the leverage constraint related to the minimal size of the financial
sector, it is relevant to explore the role of a redistributive taxation policy that
progressively limits its size.
In Section 5.3, we study the relationship between the h/entrepreneurs’ welfare,
leverage constraint, and such a redistributive taxation.
Our purpose is to investigate whether a too small (or too big) financial sector is
detrimental for the h/entrepreneurs’ welfare; this would suggest that there exists
38In the original model the limitation is extreme, since the households have access to risk-free
assets only. As a result, the equilibrium the interest rate adjusts such that stockholders borrow
the entire wealth owned by non-stockholders and make interest payments every period, which
sustains the consumption of the latter group.
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a “welfare optimal” size of the financial sector, and so that leverage constraints
and redistributive taxation may be welfare improving.
5.1 Welfare Analysis
In this section, we introduce the measure of the agents’ welfare. In general, the
welfare W i of the ith agent equals its value function V it .
39 Our result is summarised
in Proposition 1:
Proposition 1. Conditional Welfare
The conditional welfare of the i sector, for unitary capital, can be expressed as
V it := W
i(ψt) =
ln ρqtv(ψt)
i
ρ︸ ︷︷ ︸
Static
+
1
ρ
H(ψt)
i︸ ︷︷ ︸
Dynamic
, i := {h, f}, (21)
where v(ψ)i is the ith class relative wealth share and H it accounts for the i
th agents’
dynamics of wealth.
Proof. See Appendix C.5.
The welfare function in (21) is the sum of two components: the former is static,
and accounts for the current benefit due to the ownership of a certain share of the
aggregate wealth. The latter is dynamic, and summarizes the discounted benefit
of future consumption (for further details, see Appendix C.5).
In the left panel of Figure 10 we show the welfare of h/entrepreneurs’ contingent
to relative wealth share ψ (blue line). In red, we display the benchmark case ψ = 0.
What stands out is that the h/entrepreneurs’ conditional welfare W h is an
inverted U-shaped function of the financial relative capitalization ψ. For low level
of ψ, W h is increasing: the larger the financial relative capitalization, the higher
the equilibrium risk-free interest rate (see Figure 6, bottom right), the more risk
mitigation of aggregate output fluctuations is provided (see Figure 7, right), the
higher h/entrepreneurs’ welfare. Conversely, the W h turns decreasing when the
financial sector is relatively too large. In such a case, even if the supply of risk
mitigation is quite large, the small relative size of the h/entrepreneurs diminishes
their consumption growth rate (see also Figure 8, bottom panel), since a greater
share of wealth is spent -destroyed- after the payment of intermediation costs.
39Since the model is scale invariant in Kt, it is possible to write the welfare of both h/entre-
preneurs’ and financial sector for unit of physical capital.
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Figure 10: Conditional welfare of h/entrepreneurs’ (left) and financial sector (right). In
red, the benchmark cases ψ = 0 (dashed) and ψ = 1 (solid).
What is also interesting is that the level of relative financial capitalization such
that W h(ψ) is maximal roughly coincides with the level of maximum mitigation
of aggregate output fluctuations (see Figure 7, right). This result suggests that
there exists a “welfare optimal” size of the financial sector.
In the right panel of Figure 10 we repeat the same exercise with respect to
financial sector welfare W f . In blue, we plot W f contingent to the relative financial
capitalization ψ. In red, we display the benchmark case when ψ = 1.
Overall, the financial sector conditional welfare is increasing in its own relative
capitalization, and it is maximal when its relative capitalization approaches one.
This is due to relative wealth share effect on the price of physical capital (the
static terms of Equation 21). Conversely, the hump shape for middle capitalization
states is due to the pecuniary externality : a higher share of capital held by the
h/entrepreneurs maps into a higher value of physical capital stock, since fewer
resources are destroyed after the payment of the intermediation costs, and hence
to higher investments and output.
Unconditional and aggregate welfare In order to evaluate the welfare effect
of imposing leverage constraints to the financial sector, rather than of having a
redistributive policy, we may build an unconditional (expected) measure of welfare
by weighting the conditional value of (21) by the associated ergodic density pi(ψ):
E0
[
W i(ψ)
]
=
ˆ 1
0
W i(ψ)pi(ψ)dψ. (22)
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Accordingly, the aggregate welfare equals sum of expected constrained welfare
of h/entrepreneurs and financial sector weighted by a function Γ(ψ), thus
W Γ =
∑
i
E0
[
W i(ψ)
]
Γ(ψ)i. (23)
In Table 1, we compute the aggregate welfare in (23) for different weighting func-
tions: in the first, second, and third rows, it is constant Γi ∈ {0; 1; 0.5}, whereas
in the forth row it is proportional to each class relative wealth share.40
Weights, Γ(ψ)i Aggregate welfare
Γ(ψ)f = 0; Γ(ψ)h = 1 -4.7371
Γ(ψ)f = 1; Γ(ψ)h = 0 -61.12
Γ(ψ)f = Γ(ψ)h = 0.5 -32.93
Γ(ψ)f = ψ; Γ(ψ)h = 1− ψ -30.11
Table 1: Unconditional aggregate welfare for different weighting functions.
5.2 Leverage Constraints
The analysis of the previous section suggests that having a lower bound on the
size of the financial sector may be welfare improving for the h/entrepreneurs. When
leverage is counter-cyclical, as captured by our model, this can be achieved by
imposing a static a leverage constraint. Our contribution is to provide theoretical
evidence of the role that such constraints may have at determining the fluctuation
of disposable output, consumption, and thus welfare.
Hereafter, we solve the model assuming an additional constraint to the fin-
ancial sector leverage. Then, we discuss the effect of such a constraint over the
equilibrium dynamics and the associated ergodic density pi(ψ)LC . The financial
sector optimization problem is now written to take into account the additional con-
straint ωft ≤ LC. Finally, we compute the welfare in presence of a static Leverage
Constraint (LC).
40We compute the aggregate welfare in (23) numerically. In particular, we approximate the
unconditional welfare over an evenly spaced grid [0, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75, 1] and interpolate it by mul-
tinomial splines. Then, we integrate by trapezoid method Wh(ψ) over the an evenly matched
ergodic density pi(ψ) weighted by Γ(ψ).
40
With a static LC, the HJB equation of the financial sector becomes
ρVt = max{ωft ,ct}
{
ln cft +
1
dt
Et [dVt]− λt
(
ωft − LC
)}
,
where λt is the KKT multiplier and the boundary condition lims→∞ e−ρsV (es) = 0.
The problem is solved in Appendix C.6. It is relevant to highlight that, since agents
are risk averse, the LC is not always binding. It follows that the motion through
which the equilibrium shifts in and out the constrained area is state contingent:
both its speed and fluctuations depend on how restrictive the LC is. We now
discuss the effect of LC over the equilibrium dynamics as well as on the agents’
welfare.
Constrained dynamics In Figure 11 (top), we show the drift (left) and diffusion
(right) of the (constrained) equilibrium relative wealth share process. In particular,
we consider bounded (green) and unbounded (blue) LC. In red, we plot the
benchmark cases of the full risk pooling (solid) and the no risk pooling (dashed)
economy.41 What stands out is that, when the constraint binds, it reduces both
drift and diffusion of the state process. This result is intuitive since, when the
financial sector leverage is exogenously capped by the prudential policy, so it is
the supply of risk mitigation instruments to the h/entrepreneurs when financial
capitalization is scarce. This can be seen through the portfolio choices of the
agents in the states where the LC is binding.
In the same Figure (bottom), we repeat a similar analysis with respect to both
equilibrium financial sector leverage ωf (left) and h/entrepreneurs sector portfolio
share in risky claims ωh (right). What is relevant is that binding constraints
oblige h/entrepreneurs to keep a higher share of their wealth allocated in risky
assets. Accordingly, the speed at which the system drifts back towards the high
capitalization phase is weakened: intermediaries cannot leverage themselves out
of low capitalisation contingencies.
The last result is particularly clear if we look at the constrained ergodic density
of the financial sector relative wealth share pi(ψ)LC . In Figure 12 we plot the er-
godic density (left) and the cumulated density Π(ψ)LC (right) for bounded (green)
and unbounded (blue) LC.
Similarly to Phelan (2016), the effect of constraint is not uniform over ψ ∈
41Of course, in the benchmark cases LCs are utterly not relevant since the equilibrium leverage
is fixed and equal to 1.
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(0, 1), and it consists of a higher ergodic probability for the economy to remain
stuck in a low capitalisation state, i.e. a fatter left-tailed distribution. The higher
the capital constraint, the higher the mass of the left-hand side tail: the density of
the relative financial capitalization shifts to the left. Accordingly, the probability
mass of states where the financial sector is better capitalized (lower leverage) is
proportionally reduced.
Disposable output If we look to the effect of leverage constraints through the
lenses of the business cycle (see Figure 13), we find out that bounded LC to the
financial sector slightly increases the drift µY˜ (left) of disposable output growth
as well as its volatility σY˜ (right). This is because, in our model, the productivity
of h/entrepreneurs is higher then the financial sector’s (due to intermediation
costs). Naturally, by imposing a maximum leverage to the financial sector, the
aggregate wealth in the h/entrepreneurs’ (risky) portfolio is increased, and so it is
the aggregate disposable output.
What is also relevant is that the constraint impairs the mitigation effect of
systematic shocks which is indirectly generated by the financial sector (Figure 13,
left).
Consumption If it is not considered jointly with the dynamics of aggregate con-
sumption, the pattern of aggregate output may be misleading.
As we show in Figure 14 (top panel), bounded LC reduces both the drift
and diffusion aggregate consumption process. This is because, notwithstanding a
higher level of disposable output, it is relatively costlier for the agents to generate
capital for the future (the price of physical capital q is higher, and so it is the
re-investment rate ι), thus the increase the fraction of disposable output which is
spent for investment.
From the perspective of the financial sector, biding constraints reduce the
growth rate of its consumption as well of its volatility, due to the limited leverage.
Conversely, the growth rate of the h/entrepreneurs’ consumption is higher, due
to the price effect of a higher share of risky capital in their portfolio (Figure 14,
middle panel, left). At the same time, the h/entrepreneurs suffer for a scarce supply
of risk-free bonds when they are needed the most; when financial capitalization
is scarce, and the leverage constraint is binding, there is an extra exposure to
idiosyncratic risks (bottom panel, right).
In summary, the most relevant pattern is that imposing limits to leverage
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Figure 11: Top: Drift (left) and diffusion (right) of the process dψt for bounded (green)
and unbounded (blue) constraints LC. Bottom: Equilibrium financial sector’s (right)
and h/entrepreneurs’ (left) portfolio shares for bounded (green) and unbounded (blue)
LC. In red, the benchmark case of the full-risk-pooling economy. Baseline parameters:
A = 0.5, δ = 0.05, σ˜ = 0.6, η = 0.1, θ = 2, σ = 0.2, and ρ = 0.05.
Figure 12: Constrained ergodic density (left) and cumulative density (right) functions
of the relative wealth share ψ for bounded (green) and unbounded (blue) LC. Baseline
parameters: A = 0.5, δ = 0.05, σ˜ = 0.6, η = 0.1, θ = 2, σ = 0.2, and ρ = 0.05.
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Figure 13: Diffusion (left) and normalized diffusion (right) of the (aggregate) disposable
output growth rate dY˜
Y˜
for bounded(blue) and unbounded LCs. In red, the benchmark
cases of the full-risk-pooling (solid) and the no-risk-pooling (dashed) economy. Baseline
parameters: A = 0.5, δ = 0.05, σ˜ = 0.6, σ = 0.2, η = 0.1, θ = 2, and ρ = 0.05.
Figure 14: Consumption growth dynamics for bonded (green) and unbounded (blue)
LC. Top: Drift (left) and normalized diffusion (right) of the equilibrium aggregate
consumption growth rate dCC as a function of ψ. Middle: Drift (left) and normalized
volatility (right) of the financial sector consumption growth rate dc
f
cf
∝ def
ef
as a function
of ψ. Bottom: Drift (left) and normalized volatility (right) of the h/entrepreneurs’
consumption growth rate dc
h
ch
∝ deh
eh
as a function of ψ. In red, the benchmark cases of the
full-risk-pooling (solid) and the no-risk-pooling (dashed) economy. Baseline parameters:
A = 0.5, δ = 0.05, σ˜ = 0.6, σ = 0.2 η = 0.1, θ = 2 and ρ = 0.05.
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stabilizes the dynamics of the aggregate consumption by reducing its fluctuations,
since it reduces the volatility of relative wealth share. However, at the same time,
it reduces the aggregate consumption growth due to higher price of physical capital
q, since higher investments are required to generate new capital in the future.
On the other hand, the LC contribute at reducing the mitigation of the dis-
posable output fluctuations, since the constraint limit the positive externality due
to the financial sector. Moreover, a restrictive policy hinders the optimal alloca-
tion of risk by setting an upper bound to the equilibrium supply of risk-mitigation
instruments.
Welfare after LCs The welfare analysis with LCs is the same as proposed in
Section 5.1, provided that a static upper bound for the financial sector leverage
is imposed. Accordingly, in Table 1 we report the constrained and unconstrained
unconditional (aggregate) welfare for different weighting functions Γi.
We start our analysis by focusing on the h/entrepreneurs’ and financial sector
welfare apart from each other: once we look at the unconditional welfare of the
h/entrepreneurs’ before and after LCs, we find out that the constraints may be
welfare improving (Γh = 1 and Γf = 0, Table 1, second row). Conversely, when
only the financial sector is considered, we find LCs to be welfare detrimental
(Γf = 1 and Γh = 0, Table 1, third row).
These results may be better understood by looking at the agents’ conditional
welfare functions along with the ergodic distribution of the state variable (see Fig-
ure 12), left panel. In Figure 15 (left panel) we show the welfare of h/entrepreneurs’
contingent to relative wealth share ψ (blue line) or subject to a LC (green line).
In red (dashed line), we display the benchmark case ψ = 0.
What stands out is that LCs increase the h/entrepreneurs’ conditional wel-
fare when the financial sector is either under or over-capitalized. Conversely, W f
decreases for intermediate values of ψ.
In the same figure (right panel), we show the welfare of financial sector con-
tingent to relative wealth share ψ for bounded (green) and unbounded (blue) LC.
In red (solid), we display the benchmark case when ψ = 1.
What is interesting is that the benefit of the constraint for the financial sector
holds only in case of extremely low capitalisation, whereas it reduces its conditional
welfare for intermediate states where it is better capitalized. What follows is that,
in general, leverage constraints are welfare detrimental for the financial sector.
This is because, when binding, LCs keep financial sector relative capitalization ψ
at a lower level with a higher probability (see Figure 12).
45
Figure 15: Conditional welfare of the h/entrepreneurs’ (left) and of the financial sector
(right) for bounded (green) and unbounded (blue) LC. In red, the benchmark cases of
the no-risk-pooling (dashed) and the full-risk-pooling (solid) economy
Finally, in the last two rows of Table 1 we report the aggregate when the
weighting function Γ is either constant and even, or proportional to each class rel-
ative wealth share. In either cases, the leverage constraints are welfare improving.
In the former case this mean that, at this level of leverage constraint, the welfare
gain of the h/entrepreneurs’ more than compensate the welfare loss of the finan-
cial sector. Not surprisingly, the same result holds when the weighting function is
proportional to the agents’ relative share of wealth; in such a case, the welfare loss
of the financial sector in states of low capitalization is considerably under weighted
and the gain of the h/entrepreneurs’ is overweighted.
Aggregate Welfare, W ΓLC
Weights, Γ(ψ)i LC = Unbounded LC = 4
Γ(ψ)f = 0; Γ(ψ)h = 1 -4.7371 -2.58
Γ(ψ)f = 1; Γ(ψ)h = 0 -61.121 -62.86
Γ(ψ)f = Γ(ψ)h = 0.5 -32.93 -32.37
Γ(ψ)f = ψ; Γ(ψ)h = 1− ψ -30.11 -28.64
Table 2: Unconditional aggregate welfare for different weighting functions.
46
5.3 Constraints, Redistributive Taxation, and Welfare
Now that we have pointed out how leverage constraints influences the h/en-
trepreneurs’ as well as on the financial sector welfare, we conclude by addressing
two further issues, namely: a) Since LCs may be beneficial, how does the h/entre-
preneurs’ unconditional welfare change for different levels of constraints? b) What
is the role of a redistributive taxation that contributes at reducing the relative
capitalization of the financial sector?
In Figure 16, we plot the unconditional welfare of the h/entrepreneurs’ as a
function of the leverage constraint LC.42
What stands out is that, according to our previous results, constraints to the
financial sector leverage may be welfare improving for the h/entrepreneurs. In
particular, the effect on W h is positive as long as LC is not too high. Conversely,
the level of the constraint compromises the equilibrium supply of risk mitigation
instruments to the economy, and so the positive externality of the financial sector
activity, when excessively high.
There is a growing literature regarding this aspect (see Blum and Hellwig,
1995; Blum, 2008; DeAngelo and Stulz, 2015; Myerson, 2014, among the others),
however, the arguments considered for a lower leverage are based on either partial
equilibrium models or focusing on information asymmetries. To our knowledge,
our paper is the first that stresses the connection between leverage and the real as
well as financial macro-dynamics, and that explicitly highlight the mechanism that
links the agents’ welfare to the size of the financial sector in a general, although
extremely stylized, equilibrium model.
Redistributive taxation Having established the way leverage constraints affect
the agents’ welfare, we now investigate how tax transfers from the financial sector
to the h/entrepreneurs’ alter their welfare.
This is relevant because, being the LC related to the minimal size of the fin-
ancial sector only, it does not prevent it to grow too large when the constraint is
slack. In this term, the role of a redistributive taxation is to reduce the relative fin-
ancial capitalization, and so the amount of resources it destroys after the payment
of intermediation costs.
Let τ be the constant (tax) rate at which the stock of wealth is evenly re-
distributed from the financial sector to all the h/entrepreneurs’. It is possible to
42The welfare is approximated numerically with T = 200, and N = 5, 000 over a evenly 8-
spaced grid over LC ∈ [2, 10] (green diamonds). We then interpolate the obtained points by
multinomial splines (blue, solid line).
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Figure 16: Unconditional h/entrepreneurs’ welfare as a function of the leverage con-
straint. Baseline parameters: A = 0.5, δ = 0.05, σ˜ = 0.6, η = 0.1, θ = 2, σ = 0.2, and
ρ = 0.05.
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show (the derivation is in Appendix D) that, accounting for the policy, the state
variable ψ -financial relative capitalization- evolves as
dψτt
ψτt
=
dψt
ψt
− τ ψt
1− ψtdt,
where the term dψt
ψt
has dynamics as in (15).
For our purposes, we look at the effect of different tax rates τ on the h/entre-
preneurs’ conditional welfare and on the ergodic density of the state. In Figure
17 (left panel), we plot the ergodic density pi(ψ)τ for no (blue) and positive tax
rate (green). In the same Figure (right panel), we show the h/entrepreneurs’
unconditional welfare W h for an increasing level of τ .43
Not surprisingly, the redistributive policy affects the ergodic distribution by
shifting it to the right, where the financial sector has a lower relative capitalization.
In general, the higher ψ, the more effective the policy, since the redistribution is
hyperbolically increasing in the state. This is because, the absolute redistribution
is directly proportional to the wealth stock of the financial sector.44
As far as the h/entrepreneurs’ welfare is concerned (Figure 17, right panel), we
find that the redistributive taxation may be welfare improving for a moderate tax
rate τ . This is because the financial capitalization is more likely to float through
states where the mitigation externality of the financial sector is maximal, and fewer
resources are destroyed after intermediation costs. Conversely, when τ is too high,
the tax negatively affects the h/entrepreneurs’ welfare since the financial sector
is hindered from growing big enough, and so from supplying instruments of risk
mitigation to the economy.
6 Conclusions
In this paper, we investigate the mechanism through which the risk pooling
capacity of an aggregate financial sector, and thus its leverage, relates to the
economic macro-dynamics. We do so in a theoretical framework where we impose
financial frictions by segmented financial markets.
In order to mitigate the risk in their portfolios, h/entrepreneurs exchange phys-
ical capital versus risk-free bonds issued by the financial sector, who finances
43As for the results in Figure 16, the welfare function is approximated numerically over an
evenly spaced grid (green diamond) and interpolated by multinomial splines (blue, solid line).
44Note that, at the boundaries: limψ→1 ∂∂ψ
(
τ ψt1−ψt
)
=∞, while limψ→0 ∂∂ψ
(
τ ψt1−ψt
)
= τ .
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hFigure 17: Left: Ergodic state density pi(ψ)τ before (blue) and after (green) a redis-
tributive taxation policy. Right: Unconditional h/entrepreneurs’ welfare as a function
of the tax rate τ . Baseline parameters: A = 0.5, δ = 0.05, σ˜ = 0.6, η = 0.1, θ = 2,
σ = 0.2, and ρ = 0.05.
its risky assets by leveraging its balance sheet. Intermediaries’ mismatch of risk
between assets and liabilities, together with a positive cost of risk pooling, stems
into an equilibrium where heterogeneity is persistent.
The equilibrium allocation of risk generates an endogenous asset prices dynam-
ics, counter-cyclical leverage, as well as amplification or mitigation of aggregate
consumption, depending on the financial sector capitalization. Conversely, it mit-
igates disposable output fluctuations with respect to exogenous systematic shocks.
Such mechanism roots in the assumption of market segmentation and does no re-
quire binding constraints. The endogenous dynamics of financial leverage stems
from the agents’ homogeneous preferences jointly with their asymmetric exposure
to risk, which generates, in turn, structural demand for risk-mitigation instru-
ments. In this terms, amplified (mitigated) macro-dynamics are inherent to the
risk pooling activity of the financial sector.
In this setting, the existence of un-pooled idiosyncratic risk contributes to asset
prices proportionally to the relative wealth share of the h/entrepreneurs sector,
i.e. Sharpe ratios are increasing in financial leverage. On the other hand, risk-free
interest rates are decreasing in financial leverage, and negative rates are associated
to high leverage.
Finally, we investigate the relationship between the size of the financial sector,
leverage, and welfare.
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We find that limiting financial sector leverage contributes at smoothing the
aggregate consumption fluctuations. From this perspective, our model suggests
that there exists a trade-off between the welfare gain from aggregate consumption
growth and the cost from its fluctuations when leverage is limited, and so that
imposing leverage constraints may be welfare-improving for the h/entrepreneurs.
Nevertheless, the stabilizing effects of constrained leverage associates to a subop-
timal risk allocation in the economy as a whole. Moreover, binding constraints
contingencies, where the financial sector is low-capitalised and risk-free bonds are
scarcely supplied, are more persistent.
On the other side, we show that also preventing the financial sector to grow
too large, and so to destroy too many resources after intermediation costs, may be
welfare improving for the h/entrepreneurs.
These results suggest that there exist welfare improving leverage constraint and
redistributive taxation policies such that the size of the financial sector remains
within an “ optimal” range.
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A Micro-foundation
The micro-foundation structure proposed in this section is the continuous-time
equivalent of the one proposed in Ljungqvist and Sargent (2012), Chapter 12.
Firms of type II There exists a continuum of unitary mass of type II firms. Those
firms produce output at a rate A. At each instant of time t, the ith productive
firm chooses the physical capital kit in order to solve a static problem
max
kit≥0
{
yit − ptkit
}
,
s.t.
yit ≤ Akit, (24)
where pt is the rental rate of physical capital. Given linearity, the above has an
interior solution only when the following zero-profit condition is satisfied:
pt = A. (25)
If (25) holds, the size of the ith firm is indeterminate, and it is willing to supply
any market demand.
Firms of type I There exists a continuum of unitary mass of type I firms. Those
firms transform output into capital, store capital, and earn revenues by renting
capital to type II firms at the equilibrium rate pt = A. At each instant of time
t, the ith productive firm chooses how much value of capital kitqt to store in order
to earn stochastic returns dRit per unitary capital, and how much nume´raire ι
i
tk
i
t
to purchase to generate new capital Φ(ιit)k
i
t. The i
th firm finances itself by issuing
state-contingent debt to the agent who supplies the capital stock.
It follows that, between t and s, the ith firm solves the following problem
max
{kit,ιit}
EQit
[
vse
− ´ st rsdu
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Discounted ”Net” Revenues
− kitqt︸︷︷︸
Cost of Capital
 ,
s.t.
T i :
d (kitqt)
kitqt
=
(
Φ(ιit)− δ + µqt − σqtσ
)
dt+ (σ − σqt ) dWt + σ˜ ˜dW it , (26)
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where Qi is the risk neutral measure. The revenues vs are ”net” the cost of
purchasing the ”input”, which in returns equals e−
´ s
t
ιiu
qu
du for unit of capital. By
Equation (26), we know that
vs = k
i
tqte
´ s
t (Φ(ιiu)−δ+µqu−σquσ)du− 12‖Σit‖2du+
´ s
t Σ
i
tdWt︸ ︷︷ ︸
ksqs
e
´ s
t
pu−ιiu
qu
du,
where Σit =
[
σt [1i=p] σ˜
]
and dWt =
[
dWt
˜dWt
]
.
The FOC on ιit requires that
Φ′(ιiu) =
1
qu
, ∀u ∈ (t, s) .
By Type II firms optimality condition in (25), the FOC on kit implies a zero-
profit condition such that
EQ
i
t
[
e
´ s
t (µu− 12‖Σit‖2−ru)du+
´ s
t Σ
i
udWu
]
= 1. ∀i, (27)
Note that the zero profit condition is consistent with the equilibrium return on
the ith risky claim dRit. In fact,
µt :=
Et [dRit]
dt
=
A− ιit
qt
+ Φ(ιit) + µ
q
t − δ − σqtσ,
‖ Σt ‖2= (σ − σqt )2 + σ˜2 =
Vart [dRit]
dt
=⇒ σt := σ − σqt .
Condition (27) is equivalent to a non-arbitrage condition: the return on risky
claims issued by type I firms (equity), must be such that their present discoun-
ted value equals the current value of physical capital stock kitqt supplied by the
agents. If such a condition is satisfied, the firm breaks even for each kit, its size is
indeterminate, and it is willing to supply each market demand.
To grant the existence (and uniqueness) of the competitive equilibrium, con-
dition (27) must be consistent with the no-arbitrage condition for the aggregate
portfolio held by the financial sector. The result is summarised in the following
Proposition:
Proposition 2. Risk Neutral Measure
Given the zero-profit condition in (27) and the no arbitrage condition for the ag-
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gregate portfolio, the market price of systematic risk equals ξt =
µft−rt
σt
. The latter
implies that there exists a unique Qi such that the price kernel is well defined,45
and the price of idiosyncratic risk ξ˜t satisfies
ξ˜t =
µht − µft
σ˜
≥ 0⇐⇒ η ≥ 0.
Proof. Given the zero-profit condition in (27), by Girsanov Theorem III (see
Øksendal, 2003), the correspondent Radon-Nykodym derivative equals
dQi
dP
= exp
{
−
ˆ s
t
ξudWu −
ˆ s
t
ξ˜u ˜dWu − 1
2
ˆ s
t
(
ξ2u + ξ˜
2
u
)
du
}
.
where P is the real probability measure, while ξt and ξ˜t represent the market prices
of systematic and idiosyncratic risk respectively. Given the no-arbitrage condition
for the aggregate portfolio:
EQ
f
t
[
e
´ s
t (µ
f
u− 12σ2u−ru)du+
´ s
t σ
2
udWu
]
= 1,
it follows that
dQf
dP
= exp
{
−
ˆ s
t
ξtdu− 1
2
ˆ s
t
ξ2t dWu
}
⇐⇒ ξt = µ
f
t − rt
σt
.
The latter implies that the martingale measure for the ith firm Qi satisfies
dWQ
i
t =
[
ξt
ξ˜t
]
dt+ dWt.
where ξ˜t =
µht −µft
σ˜
= 1
σ˜
η
qt
and, thus
kisqse
− ´ st (ru−A−ιuqu )du = kitqte−
´ t
t (ru−A−ιuqu )du +
ˆ s
t
Σ
′
tdW
Qi
t .
45When the intermediation costs are null η = 0, it follows that ξ˜t = 0 and, in turn, Qi = Qf .
This case is consistent with the benchmark where markets are complete.
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By taking the expected value under the probability measure Qi, it follows that
EQ
i
t
[
kisqse
− ´ st (ru−A−ιuqu )du
]
= kitqt + E
Qi
t
[ˆ s
t
ΣtdW
Qi
t
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
0
,
is a martingale under Qi.
B Limited Participation and Transaction Costs
In this appendix we consider the generalisation of the competitive equilibrium
in Section 3 where both classes of agents, h/entrepreneurs and financial interme-
diaries respectively, have full access to risk-free bonds and pooled (p) as well as
un-pooled (n) risky claims. In particular we as assume that, in order to pool
risky claims from different firms, the h/entrepreneurs have to pay a transaction
cost ε. In this terms we show that market segmentation arises naturally when the
transaction cost is big enough with respect to the financial intermediation cost η.
Given the problem in (3), the optimal pooled and un-pooled portfolio choices
of both classes of agents satisfy the following:
ωi,nt =
µt − rt
σ2t + σ˜
2
, i = h, f ; (28)
ωf,pt =
µt − ηqt − rt
σ2t
, ωh,pt =
µt − εqt − rt
σ2t
. (29)
In equilibrium, the whole amount of wealth invested in risky claims, whether
it is pooled or not, must equal the aggregate amount of physical capital, whereas
the risk-free bonds must be in zero net supply. By market clearing conditions, it
follows that (
ωh,nt + ω
h,p
t
)
(1− ψt) +
(
ωf,pt + ω
f,n
t
)
ψt = 1, (30)(
1− ωh,nt − ωh,pt
)
(1− ψt) +
(
1− ωf,pt − ωf,nt
)
ψt = 0. (31)
By matching equations (28) and (29), the market clearing conditions (30) and
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(31), it is possible to show that:
ωft = ω
f,n
t + ω
f,p
t = 1 +
ε− η
qt
1 + ψt
σ˜2
σ2t
2σ2t + σ˜
2
, (32)
and
ωht = ω
h,p
t + ω
h,n
t = 1−
ε−η
qt
σ2t
ψt. (33)
In this terms, we are looking for those parametric conditions such that there
exists limited market participation, i.e. the financial sector always leverages its
balance sheet by issuing risk-free bonds. Conversely, h/entrepreneurs smooth con-
sumption by allocating their wealth into both risky and risk-free claims in positive
amounts whatever share of total wealth. The aforementioned conditions are satis-
fies if the following holds: 
ωft = ω
f,p
t + ω
f,n
t > 1
ωht = ω
h,p
t + ω
h,n
t > 0,
ωht = ω
h,p
t + ω
h,n
t < 1.
(34)
By matching equations (32) and (33) with system (34), we find that the fol-
lowing conditions must hold
ε > η ⇒ ωht < 1, ωft > 1,
while
ε < η + σ2t
qt
ψt
⇒ ωht > 0.
Is summary, the transition cost for h/entrepreneurs ε is required to be bounded:
η < ε < η + min
ψt
{
σ2t (ψt)
qt(ψt)
ψt
}
.
The lower bound grants a comparative advantage to the financial sector at pooling
risk, whereas the upper bound prevents the h/entrepreneurs to short the un-pooled
security in equilibrium.
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C Proofs
C.1 The Agents’ Problem
Given a generic CRRA utility function, we know that
lim
γ→1
c1−γt − 1
1− γ = ln ct. (35)
To our purpose we consider the affine transform
u(ct) :=
c1−γt
1− γ , (36)
since (35) and (36) have the same maximizer. Given the agents’ problem, the
Hamiltonian satisfies
ρVt = max{ωt,ct}
{
u(ct) +
1
dt
Et [dVt]
}
,
subjected to the terminal condition limt→∞ e−ρtV (eit) = 0. Given the generic
motion of wealth stock of the ith agent,
deit
eit
=
[
rt + ωt
(
µit − rt
)− ct
et
]
dt+ ωtΣ
′
tdWt,
it is possible to demonstrate that the first order conditions satisfy
ct
et
= A−1 (37)
and
ωt =
µit − rt
γ (σit)
2 + (AΣ
′
t)
−1A′zΩ
z
t , (38)
where µ<t and σ
z
t represent the state drift and diffusion, respectively. By taking
the limit for γ → 1, it follows that the HJB for log-utility can be then written as
1 + A′t + A
′
zµ
z
t +
A′′zz (Ω
z
t )
′ (Ωzt )
2
= ρA. (39)
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By Feynman-Kacˇ Theorem (see Huyeˆn (2009)), the solution of Equation (39) sat-
isfies
A(t, zt) = Et
[ˆ ∞
t
e−ρ(s−t)ds
]
=
1
ρ
.
From (37) and (38), it follows that
ct = ρnt,
and
ωt =
µit − rt
(σit)
2 , (40)
respectively. The result is equivalent to (Merton, 1969; Samuelson, 1969).
C.2 Equilibrium Portfolios, Leverage, and Prices
According to Definition 2, the market clearing conditions for physical capital
and risk-free bonds in Equations (8) and (9) can be written in terms of relative
wealth share as:
ωft E
f
t + ω
h
t E
h
t = Ktqt ⇐⇒ ωht (1− ψt) + ωft ψt = 1,
Eft (1− ωft ) + Eht (1− ωht )
Ktqt
= 0⇐⇒ (1− ωht ) (1− ψt) = (ωft − 1)ψt. (41)
The clearing on the consumption good market (10) holds by Walras Law and
equals:
(A− ιt − η)Ktψt + (A− ιt)Kt (1− ψt) = ρKtqt. (42)
By matching the market clearing condition on capital (42) and the optimal
portfolios (40), we obtain
ωft =
1
ψt
− µt − rt
σ2t
(1− ψt)
ψt
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which, by Lemma 1, can be written as
ωft =
1
ψt
−
η
qt
σ2t + σ˜
2
(1− ψt)
ψt
− (1− ψt)
ψt
(
µft − rt
)
σ2t︸ ︷︷ ︸
ωft
σ2t
σ2t + σ˜
2
.
Rearranging we find that
ωft =
σ2t + σ˜
2 − η
qt
(1− ψt)
ψtσ˜2 + σ2t
. (43)
By substituting (43) into the market clearing for the risk-free bond (41), it is
straightforward to find ωht . Similarly, the equilibrium interest rate rt can be ob-
tained from (40). The results are summarized in the following Proposition:
Proposition 3. Equilibrium Portfolios and Interest Rate
Equilibrium portfolio shares ωft , ω
h
t and the interest rate rt depend on relative
wealth share ψt only:
ωft =
σ˜2 + σ2t − ηqt (1− ψt)
ψtσ˜2 + σ2t
, ωht = 1−
(
ωft − 1
) ψt
1− ψt .
rt =
ρ
ψt
−
(
1 + θA− qt
θqt
)
1− ψt
ψt
+ Φ(ιt)− δ + µqt − σqtσ − (σt)2 ωft .
We assumed both classes of agents have the same preferences. It follows that
the portfolio share of the financial sector must be greater than or equal to 1. This
is because, since the risk-free bond is in zero net supply, a positive portfolio share
in bonds by the financial sector must be supplied by h/entrepreneurs. In equilib-
rium, this is not possible due to h/entrepreneurs assets exposure to idiosyncratic
risk. Under the assumption that the idiosyncratic volatility σ˜2 is greater then the
intermediation cost rate η
qt
, the financial sector portfolio share ωft is strictly greater
then 1. The result is summarised in the following Corollary of Proposition 3 :
Corollary 1. Financial Leverage
When the idiosyncratic volatility is greater then the intermediation cost rate, the
financial sector holds a leveraged position, while the h/entrepreneurs hold positive
portfolio shares in both risky and risk-free claims:
σ˜2 >
η
qt
, ⇒ ωft > 1, ωht ∈ (0, 1),
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Proof. The result comes after solving ωft > 1.
Under the assumption of log investment function Φ(ιt) =
ln(θιt+1)
θ
, where the
parameter θ represents the cost of technical non-fungibility between physical cap-
ital and consumption good, the price of physical capital qt and the rate of re-
investment ιt are affine transforms of the state ψt. In fact, by matching the con-
sumption market clearing condition in (42) with the Tobin’s Q in Equation (13),
it follows that:
qt =
1 + θ(A− ηψt)
1 + θρ
, ιt =
qt − 1
θ
. (44)
C.3 Proof of Theorem 1, points 1 and 2
Given the state
ψt :=
Eft
Ktqt
,
by Itoˆ’s lemma,
dψt =
∂ψt
∂Eft
dEft +
∂ψt
∂Ktqt
dKtqt +
1
2
∂2ψt
∂
(
Eft
)2 (dEft )2 +
+
1
2
∂2ψt
∂ (Ktqt)
2d (Ktqt)
2 +
∂2ψt
∂ (Ktqt) ∂E
f
t
dKtqtdE
f
t .
By substituting the optimal portfolio in the budget constraint of the financial
sector we have
dEft
Eft
=
(
1− ωft
)
rtdt− ρdt+ µft ωft dt+ ωft σtdWt, (45)
while the aggregate wealth evolves as
dKtqt
Ktqt
= µft dt+ ψt
η
qt
dt+ σtdWt − ρdt. (46)
Given Equations (45) and (46) it follows that
dψt = ψt
dEft
Eft
− ψtdKtqt
Ktqt
+ ψtσ
2
t dt− ψtσ2tωft dt.
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By considering Proposition 3 and rearranging,
dψt
ψt
= σ2t
[
1 + ωft
(
ωft − 2
)
− ψt
σ2t
η
qt
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
µψt
dt+ σt
(
ωft − 1
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
σψt
dWt.
Point 2 can be proved by looking for a Markov equilibrium in the state variable
ψt. Similarly to Haven et al. (2016), if such an equilibrium exists, one must be
able to express both drifts and diffusion in Equation (12) as a function of ψt only.
By Itoˆ’s lemma,
dqt = q
′(ψt)ψtµ
ψ
t dt+
1
2
q′′(ψt)ψ2t
(
σψt
)2
dt− q′(ψt)ψtσψt dWt. (47)
By matching drifts and diffusions of the dynamic Equations (47) and (12) we
obtain the system in (16).
C.4 Proof of Theorem 1, points 3 and 4
Persistent heterogeneity In the neighbourhood of the right-hand side boundary,
limψ→1− σ
q
t = 0 implies, by continuity, that
lim
ψ→1−
ωft = 1⇒ lim
ψ→1−
σψt = 0.
By the latter,
lim
ψ→1−
µψt = −
(
η (1 + θρ)
1 + θ(A− η)
)
< 0⇐⇒ η > 0. (48)
Similarly, in the neighbourhood of the left-hand side boundary, limψt→0+ σ
q
t = 0.
The latter implies that
lim
ψ→0+
µψt = ∆
2, lim
ψ→0+
σψt = ∆,
where, by (44),
∆ = σ˜2 −
(
η (1 + θρ)
1 + θ(A− η)
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
η
q¯
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is a positive constant. It follows that, in the surroundings of the left-hand side
boundary, the dynamics of ψt behaves as a geometric Brownian motion with pos-
itive drift:
ψt =  exp
{(
1
2
∆2
)
t+ ∆Wt
}
, (49)
where  is a positive number arbitrary close to 0. Hence, the process never reaches
the absorbing state ψ = 0.
Given the Markov equilibrium in Theorem 1, and conditions (48) and (49), we
know that state drift µψt has positive sign at the left-hand side boundary whereas
it is negative sign at the right-hand side one. It suffices to prove its derivative
negative along the whole domain to grant a unique ψˆ ∈ (0, 1) such that µψt (ψˆ) = 0.
In this fashion
∂
∂ψt
µψt < 0,∀ψt ∈ (0, 1), (50)
which leads to,
2
(
ωft
)′
(σ − σqt )2
(
ωft − 1
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
A
−2
(
ωft
)2
(σ − σqt ) (σqt )′+
− η
(
ρ+ 1
θ
)
1
θ
+ ηψt + A
− ψt
η2
(
ρ+ 1
θ
)[
1
θ
+ ηψt + A
]2︸ ︷︷ ︸
B
+
− 2 (σ − σqt ) (σqt )′ + 4 (σ − σqt ) (σqt )′ ωft < 0.
and, after some algebra,
(σqt )
′ (σ − σqt )
(
ωft − 1
)2
>
A+B
2
. (51)
Provided that we assume (and numerically check) (ωft )
′ < 0, σ > σqt > 0 and
(σqt )
′ ≥ 0, condition (51) is always satisfied, since A,B < 0 and ωft > 1. Moreover,
by Theorem 1 σψt ∝ σqt , it follows that σqt > 0⇒ σψt > 0.
By considering the dynamics of dψt in Theorem 1, a unique ergodic distribution
pi(ψ) exists as long as the first two moments of ψt exist and are finite. A rigorous
discussion of the sufficient conditions of existence of the ergodic for Ito’s Processes
is in Zhenzhong and Chen (2013). Although we cannot derive closed-form solution
67
for ψt, its first moment can be determined as
d
(
e−
´ t
0 µ
ψ
s dsψt
)
= −e−
´ t
0 µ
ψ
s dsµψs ψtdt+ e
− ´ t0 µψs dsdψt = e−
´ t
0 µ
ψ
s dsψtσ
ψ
t dWt.
If we integrate both sides and take expected value, we have
E0 [ψt] = ψ0E0
[
e
´ t
0 µ
ψ
s ds
]
+ E0
[
e
´ t
0 µ
ψ
s ds
ˆ t
0
e−
´ s
0 µ
ψ
uduψsσ
ψ
s dWs
]
.
Since the term in dWs is an Itoˆ integral, it has expected value equals zero and thus
E0 [ψt] = ψ0E0
[
e
´ t
0 µ
ψ
s ds
]
(52)
where ψ0 is an arbitrary starting point. Thus, the first moment of the distribution
is defined as long as E0
[
e
´ t
0 µ
ψ
s ds
]
< ∞. We prove it numerically by simulation.
Similarly we can derive the variance as
Var0 [ψt] = E0
[
ψ2t
]− E0 [ψt]2 . (53)
The first term of (53) we can be found by solving
d(x2) = 2xdx+ 2dx2
where x = e−
´ t
0 µ
ψ
s dsψt, which leads to
d
(
e−2
´ t
0 µ
ψ
s dsψ2t
)
= 2e−
´ t
0 µ
ψ
s dsψte
− ´ t0 µψs dsψtσψt dWt + e−2
´ t
0 µ
ψ
s ds
(
ψtσ
ψ
t
)2
dt.
It follows that
E0
[
ψ2t
]
= ψ20E0
[
e2
´ t
0 µ
ψ
s ds
]
+ E0E
[
e2
´ t
0 µ
ψ
s ds
ˆ t
0
e−2
´ t
0 µ
ψ
s ds
(
ψsσ
ψ
s
)2
ds
]
and thus
Var0 [ψt] = 2E0
[
e2
´ t
0 µ
ψ
s ds
ˆ t
0
e−2
´ s
0 µ
ψ
udu
(
ψsσ
ψ
s
)2
ds
]
.
Thus, the second (central) moment of the distribution is defined as long as Var0 [ψt] <
∞. We prove it numerically by simulation.
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The Ergodic Density The Fokker-Plank equation for the ergodic density satisfies
∂
∂t
pi(ψ, t) = − ∂
∂ψ
{
ψµψpi (ψ, t)− 1
2
∂
∂ψ
[
ψ2
(
σψt
)2
pi (ψ, t)
]}
= 0. (54)
By integrating over (0, ψ) and rearranging, we can write (54) as the following ODE
d lnh (ψ) = 2
µψ
ψ (σψ)2
,
where
h (ψ) = pi (ψ)ψ2
(
σψ
)2
.
By integrating one more time, given a boundary condition h(0) = h0, we obtain
the density function of ψt as
pi (ψ) =
h0e
´ ψ
0
2µψ(s)
s(σψ(s))
2 ds
ψ2 (σψ)2
,
where h0 is such that
´ 1
0
pi(ψ)dψ = 1.
C.5 Proof of Proposition 1
By following the approach in Haven et al. (2016), we know that the optimal
consumption of the log agent satisfies ln cit = ln ρe
i
t. By considering the dynamics
of aggregate wealth
deit
eit
= µe,it dt+ σ
e,i
t dWt,
it follows that, by Itoˆ’s Lemma,
d ln ρeit =
1
ρ
[
µe,it −
1
2
∥∥Σit∥∥2] dt+ 1ρΣitdWt.
By integrating over (0, s) and multiplying by e−ρs
e−ρs
(
ln ρeis − ln ρei0
)
= e−ρs
{ˆ s
0
[
µe,iu −
1
2
∥∥Σiu∥∥2] du+ ˆ s
0
ΣitdWu
}
.
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By integrating over (0,∞) and taking expected value
E0
[ˆ ∞
0
e−ρs ln ρeisds
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
W i(ψ)
=
ln ρei0
ρ
+ E0
[ˆ ∞
0
e−ρs
ˆ s
0
µe,iu −
1
2
∥∥Σiu∥∥2 duds] .
By changing variable
ˆ ∞
0
e−ρs
[ˆ s
0
µe,iu −
1
2
∥∥Σiu∥∥2 du] ds = ˆ ∞
0
ˆ ∞
u
e−ρs
[
µe,iu −
1
2
∥∥Σiu∥∥2 du] dsdu
ˆ ∞
0
{
−1
ρ
e−ρs
[
µe,iu −
1
2
∥∥Σiu∥∥2 du]}∞
u
du =
1
ρ
ˆ ∞
0
e−ρu
[
µe,iu −
1
2
∥∥Σiu∥∥2 du] du.
Thus, for a unitary aggregate capital Kt = 1, considering agents of the class h
W h(ψ0) =
ln ρq0(1− ψ0)
ρ
+
1
ρ
E0
ˆ ∞
0
e−ρs µe,hs −
1
2
(
ωhs
)2 (
σ2s + σ˜
2
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
f(ψs)
ds
 . (55)
By Feynman-Kacˇ Theorem (see Huyeˆn (2009)),
W h(ψt) =
ln ρqt(1− ψt)
ρ
+
1
ρ
Hh(ψt).
where H(ψt)
p solves the associated ODE
ρH(ψ)h = f(ψ) +H(ψ)hψµ
ψψ +
H(ψ)hψψ
(
σψψ
)2
2
.
We compute the value of H i conditional on the state ψ0 by numerical simulation.
C.6 Constrained Portfolios
By considering the constrained version of the problem in Appendix C.1, by
standard dynamic programming the HJB satisfies
ρVt = max{ωt,ct}
{
ln ct +
1
dt
Et [dVt]− λt(ωt − LC)
}
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where λt is the Lagrangian multiplier associated to the constraint
ωt ≤ LC.
By taking FOCs and considering complementary slackness, given the dynamics of
Vt, the optimal portfolio share ω
C
t satisfies the following system:
ωUt − ωCt = λtρσ2t ,
λt
(
ωCt − LC
)
= 0,
λt ≥ 0,
ωCt − LC ≤ 0,
(56)
where ωUt is the unconstrained solution. The possible couples
{
ωCt , λt
}
that satisfy
(56) are: {
ωCt = ω
U
t , λt = 0 ω
U
t < LC
ωCt = LC, λt = ρσ
2
t
(
ωUt − LC
)
ωUt ≥ LC.
C.7 Macro-dynamics
By Itoˆ’s lemma, the dynamics of aggregate consumption Ct = (A− ιt − ψtη)Kt
is given by
dCt = (A− ιt − ψtη) dKt −Ktdιt − ηKtdψt − Cov [dιt, dKt]− Cov [dψt, dKt] .
By considering the stochastic processes dKt and dψt and
dιt =
1
θ
(qtµ
q
t − qtσqt dWt) ,
we obtain, by substitution and rearranging
dCt
Ct
= (Φ(ιt)− δ) dt− 1
θ
qtµ
q
t + θηψtµ
ψ
t + qtσ
q
tσ − θψt (σ − σqt )
(
ωft − 1
)
σ
A− ιt − ψtη dt+
+ σ
(
1−
(
1− σ
q
t
σ
)
ηψt
ωft − 1
A− ιt − ψtη +
qt
θ
σqt
σ
1
A− ιt − ψtη
)
dWt.
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By Itoˆ’s lemma, the dynamics of aggregate investment It = ιtKt is given by
dIt = d (ιtKt) = Ktdιt + ιtdKt + Cov [dιtdKt] ,
and, after substituting and rearranging,
dIt
It
=
[
Φ(ιt)− δ + qt
θιt
(µqt − σqtσ)
]
+ σ
(
1− 1
θ
σqt
σ
qt
ιt
)
dWt.
Similarly, the dynamics of aggregate intermediation costs Gt = ηψtKt is given
by
dGt = d (ηψtKt) = η [ψtdKt +Ktdψt + Cov (dψt, dKt)] ,
thus
dGt
Gt
=
[
Φ(ιt)− δ + µψt + σσψt
]
dt+ σ
[
1 +
(
1− σ
q
t
σ
)(
ωft − 1
)]
dWt.
It follows that
dY˜t
Y˜t
= Φ(ιt)− δ + ψtη
µψt + σσt
(
ωft − 1
)
A− ψtη dt+ σ
1− ψt(1− σqt
σ
) (ωft ) η
A− ψtη
 dWt.
D Redistributive Taxation
In this appendix, we describe the equilibrium dynamics of the relative financial
capitalization ψ when an exogenous taxation evenly redistributes resources at a
rate τ from the financial sector to the h/entrepreneurs. In this setting, we consider
the case where the taxation is constant and equals τ for every value of the state
ψ ∈ (0, 1).
Since all the agents have log preferences and the tax transfer is proportional to
their whole stock of wealth, it does not directly affect their portfolio and consump-
tion choices. It does instead affect their conditional and unconditional welfare.
Let the dynamic budget constraint of the h/entrepreneurs’ and of the financial
sector evolve as
dEht = E
h
t
(
µe,ht dt+ σ
e,h
t dWt
)
+ τEft dt︸ ︷︷ ︸
(Positive) Tax
, (57)
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dEft = E
f
t
(
µe,ft dt+ σ
e,f
t dWt
)
− τEft dt︸ ︷︷ ︸
(Negative) Tax
, (58)
respectively, where the drift and diffusion terms µe,it , σ
e,i
t i ∈ {h, f} are defined in
Equation (4). The tax terms in Equations (57) and (58) represent the redistribu-
tion effect of wealth between sectors by mean of the taxation policy. Note that
the absolute value of the tax, τEft , is directly proportional to the financial sector
stock of wealth Eft ; as such it proportionally enters the h/entrepreneurs’ dynamic
budget constraint.
By Itoˆ’s Lemma, the level of relative financial capitalization evolves as
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,
where the dynamics of wealth follow the processes in (57) and (58). By substitut-
ing, rearranging, and considering:
Eht
Eft
:= 1
ψt
− 1:
dψτt
ψτt
=
dψt
ψt
− τ ψt
1− ψtdt,
where the process dψt
ψt
is defined as in (15).
E Comparative Dynamics
In this Appendix, we discuss the changes of equilibrium dynamics with respect
to the key parameters in the model, namely the size of systematic and idiosyncratic
risk as well as intermediation costs.
Figure 18 shows the drift (left) and diffusion (right) of the process dψt as a
function of the state ψ ∈ (0, 1) for different values of systematic diffusion σ. In
Figure 19, we perform the same comparative statics for equilibrium portfolio shares
ωf and ωh. In the bottom graphs, we consider two sections of the upper ones for
increasing levels of σ = 0.2 (blue) and 0.6 (green). In red, we plot the benchmark
case of the full risk pooling economy.
With reference to Figure 18, when the financial sector is arbitrary well cap-
italised (ψ is high), decreasing systematic risk σ has the effect of reducing σψ:
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Figure 18: Top: Drift (left) and diffusion (right) of the process dψt for different values
of systematic volatility σ. Bottom: Drift and diffusion for high (green) and low (blue)
values of σ. In red, the benchmark case of the full risk pooling economy. Baseline
parameters: A = 0.5, δ = 0.05, σ˜ = 1.2, η = 0.1, θ = 2, and ρ = 0.05.
the lower the risk, the lower both state drift and diffusion. When instead ψ ap-
proaches the left side boundary ψ = 0, a lower σ is associated to higher leverage
and reduced risky asset in h/entrepreneurs’ portfolio (Figure 19). Indeed, higher
leverage is associated to a sharper drift µψ. This phenomenon is associated to
the so-called volatility paradox (Adrian and Boyarchenko, 2012; Brunnermeier and
Sannikov, 2014; Phelan, 2016).
Figure 20 displays a similar exercise by plotting equilibrium portfolio choices
over ψ ∈ (0, 1) with respect to different values of idiosyncratic diffusion σ˜. In the
bottom graphs, we consider two sections of the upper ones for increasing levels of
σ˜ = 0.8 (blue) and 1.2 (green). In red, we plot the benchmark case of the full risk
pooling economy. What stands out is that the lower the idiosyncratic risk the lower
the equilibrium leverage of the financial sector. This pattern is the consequence
of a reduced advantage of the financial sector due to pooling: when idiosyncratic
risk is relatively lower, the demand for mitigation is also reduced, h/entrepreneurs
keep a wider fraction of their wealth allocated in risky claims, and equilibrium
risk-free rate is higher.
Finally, in Figure 21 (top) we repeat the same analysis for different values of
intermediation costs η. In the bottom graphs, we consider two sections of the
upper ones for null (blue) and positive (green) intermediation costs η. In red, we
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Figure 19: Top: Equilibrium portfolio shares ωf (left) and ωh (right) for different values
of systematic diffusion σ. Bottom: Portfolio shares for high (green) and low (blue) values
of σ. In red, the benchmark case of the full risk pooling economy. Baseline parameters:
A = 0.5, δ = 0.05, σ˜ = 1.2, η = 0.1, θ = 2, and ρ = 0.05.
plot the benchmark case of complete markets. From Figure 21 we notice that,
when there are no intermediation costs, the drift µψt is positive for each ψ. In
the long-run the financial sector dominates and thus its drains the whole wealth
in the economy.46 Moreover, positive intermediation costs (green) mainly affect
the right-hand side of the state space, when ψ approaches ψ¯ = 1. Higher costs
progressively sharpen the negative drift, when the financial sector is relatively well
capitalised, making faster the recovery of h/entrepreneurs relative wealth.
Comparative Ergodic Figure 22 (top) shows the density pi(ψ) for different values
of σ (left). We repeat the same exercise for different values of σ˜ (right). In the
bottom panels, we graph two sections of the upper ones for high (green) and low
(blue) values of σ and σ˜ respectively.
The most relevant feature of Figure 22 (right) is that when σ increases, so it
does the average financial sector wealth share, whereas when the systematic risk
crosses a certain threshold (the magnitude of the idiosyncratic risk σ˜), the ergodic
wealth share shifts back towards a lower financial sector wealth share.
In this regards, whatever the sources of risk which is increased, the pooling
power of the financial sector gets more valuable. This pattern persists as long
46This case is equivalent to the equilibrium where markets are complete for both classes agents.
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Figure 20: Top: Equilibrium portfolio shares ωf (left) and ωh (right) for different values
of idiosyncratic diffusion σ˜. Bottom: Portfolio shares for high (green) and low (blue)
values of σ˜. In red, the benchmark case of the full risk pooling economy. Baseline
parameters: A = 0.5, δ = 0.05, σ = 0.4, η = 0.1, θ = 2, and ρ = 0.05.
Figure 21: Top: Drift (left) and diffusion (right) of the process dψt for different inter-
mediation costs η. Bottom: Drift and diffusion for high (green) and low (blue) values
of η. In red, the benchmark case of the full risk pooling economy. Baseline parameters:
A = 0.5, δ = 0.05, σ˜ = 1.2, σ = 0.4, θ = 2, and ρ = 0.05.
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Figure 22: Top: Ergodic density pi(ψ) of relative wealth share ψt for different values of
σ (left) σ˜ (right). Bottom: Ergodic density for high (green) and low (blue) values of σ
(left) and σ˜ (right). Baseline parameters: δ = 0.05, σ˜ = 1.2, η = 0.1, θ = 2, σ = 0.4 and
ρ = 0.05.
as the idiosyncratic diffusion σ˜ > σ. Furthermore, the higher σ, the higher the
probability of extremely low capitalization, due to increasing leverage.
Similarly, to decreasing idiosyncratic diffusion is associated greater density
mass to states where the financial sector has lower capitalisation (see Figure 22,
right). In other words, if the pooling power does not reward the associated cost,
the financial sector turns progressively marginal. Conversely, the higher the idio-
syncratic risk component with respect to systematic, the higher the ergodic wealth
share of the financial sector: since h/entrepreneurs are more exposed to extra risks,
the aggregate demand for bonds rises and thus intermediaries have greater pooling
power and pay lower interest rates.
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